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vABSTRACT 
 
 The North Korean nuclear weapons issue reached a dangerous impasse in the last 
eighteen months as North Korea continues to resist international pressure to halt its 
nuclear weapons and missile programs.  North Korea watchers and nuclear experts 
estimate that North Korea could have up to six or seven plutonium-based nuclear bombs 
by now.  Indeed, North Korea announced to the world in October 2003 that they now 
have the capability of “nuclear deterrence.”  All would agree that a nuclear North Korea 
will have grave consequences on the Korean Peninsula and the East Asia region. 
Accordingly, this thesis contends that the Bush administration miscalculated in its 
policy on North Korea by letting its hard-line ideology cloud its better judgment on what 
is the most feasible and prudent policy vis-à-vis North Korea.  Given the events in the 
last year or so, this thesis makes the assumption that North Korea already possesses 
nuclear weapons.  Indeed, the CIA has made formal statements saying that North Korea, 
in essence, already possesses nuclear weapons.  The intelligence service believes that 
conventional explosives tests, conducted since the 1980s, have allowed the North 
Koreans to verify that their nuclear designs would work. The agency believes North 
Korea has one or two nuclear weapons similar to what the United States dropped on 
Hiroshima during World War II.    
Given these circumstances and the policy options available to the Bush 
administration, the best course of action and the most elegant solution to this messy 
problem, is to adopt a policy of unifying the two Koreas.  The argument is that a 
reunified Korea -- united diplomatically with the U.S. leading the way in a multilateral 
forum -- would satisfy most, if not all, of U.S. interests by:  1) resolving, once and for all, 
the North Korean nuclear problem;  2) eliminating the possibility of another Korean war;  
3) neutralizing or even weakening China’s growing influence over South Korea and East 
Asia;  4) strengthening the United States’ role and influence on the Korea peninsula and 
the region;  5) eliminating Japan’s primary security threat and paving the way for a 
stronger alliance between the U.S., a united Korea, and Japan;  and  6) fulfilling the 
obligation to unify the two Koreas after almost sixty years of illegitimate separation.  In 
essence, it is in the United States’ overall interest (including both strategic and values-
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1I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 The North Korean nuclear issue reached a dangerous impasse in the last eighteen 
months as North Korea continues to resist international pressure to halt its nuclear 
weapons and missile programs.  North Korea watchers and nuclear experts estimated that 
North Korea could have up to six or seven plutonium-based nuclear bombs by the end of 
2003.1  Indeed, North Korea announced to the world in October 2003 that they now have 
the capability of “nuclear deterrence.”2  At the heart of this issue is whether the U.S. and 
the international community can tolerate a North Korea that possesses the operational 
capability of nuclear weapons.  The clear answer of most political scientists and East 
Asia regional experts is an emphatic “no.”  From all indications, a nuclear-weaponized 
North Korea is not tolerable by any measure because it goes against all U.S. national 
interests and can have seismic geopolitical implications in the East Asia region.3 
The challenge for U.S. policymakers, thus, is how to deal with a North Korea that 
is developing or already possesses nuclear weapons capability.  Despite numerous 
economic sanctions and international pressure to halt its nuclear weapons program, North 
Korea has been resolute in its drive to develop nuclear weapons and medium range 
missiles for their delivery.  There are two main schools of thought on how to deal with 
North Korea:  1)  Engagement -- the Clinton administration’s approach that was more 
geared toward diplomacy and eventually led to the 1994 Agreed Framework.  Critics 
labeled it “appeasement” and contended that the U.S. was rewarding bad behavior and 
was setting a bad precedent on how to deal with rogue nations.  2)  Hard-line --  the Bush 
administration’s more hawkish approach, refusing to negotiate bilaterally until North 
Korea gives up its nuclear weapons program.  Critics contend that it is giving North 
Korea valuable time and allowing it to further develop nuclear weapons.     
                                                 
1 See transcripts of PBS Frontline interview with former Secretary of Defense William Perry, 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/themes/what.html, February 2003, last accessed on August 
2003  
2 From CNN Correspondent Sohn, Jie-Ae, “NK ready to unveil Nuclear Deterrence,” 16  October 
2003, www.cnn.com, last accessed on October 2003 
3 Laney, James T., Shaplen, Jason T., “How to Deal With North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, New York, 
March/April 2003 
 
2Neither of these approaches, however, has been proven effective in preventing 
North Korea from pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.  One 
lingering question is how did this happen?  Why did the U.S. and the other major powers 
allow a rogue state like North Korea to possess nuclear weapons?  Or, was it inevitable 
that North Korea, virtually isolated from the world community and on the verge of 
collapse, would attempt to develop nuclear weapons, which has become in this new 
international order, about the only thing that can ensure its survival.  Indeed, many 
political scientists believe that nuclear weapons capability is the ultimate deterrent for 
attack by a more powerful country.4   
It was just three years ago that Secretary of State Madeline Albright was having 
toasts with Kim Jong-il when she visited North Korea, becoming the highest ranking U.S. 
official to visit North Korea since the Korean War.  Just sixteen months later, however, 
President Bush denounced North Korea and included it as part of the “Axis of Evil” 
along with Iran and Iraq.  As a result, tensions started to escalate and in February 2003, 
North Korea announced that it was restarting its plutonium-based nuclear program at the 
Yongbyon complex.  The ensuing attempts at negotiation were stalemated as both the 
U.S. and North Korea were unwilling to give in to each other’s demands.  In the 
meantime, the stalemate provided North Korea valuable time to reprocess the spent-fuel 
rods to develop plutonium-based nuclear weapons.    
The purpose of this thesis is to first, examine the true national interest of the U.S. 
vis-à-vis the two Koreas and secondly, offer options and recommendations on the 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear standoff.  This thesis will trace the roots of this 
conflict back to the end of World War II and the creation of the two Koreas, and analyze 
how it has come to this dangerous impasse, and present policy options and 
recommendations for its resolution. 
The fact that North Korea, from all indications, now possesses nuclear weapons 
brings up many intriguing questions.  Was it a policy miscalculation on the part of the 
Bush administration?  Was it an oversight due to the Iraqi conflict?  Or was it by design?  
                                                 
4 Kenneth Waltz expresses this view in “Conversations with History:Institute of International Studies,” 
UC Berkeley, 10 February, 2003, Can be accessed on http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-
con0.html, last accessed on August 2004 
3What are the short and long-term implications to the delicate balance of power in East 
Asia?  It is highly doubtful that it was by design because that would presume that the 
Bush administration would feel they can accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons 
capability.  A nuclear North Korea, however, is not tolerable by any measure due to its 
severe implications in the East Asia region.  Thus, a nuclear weapons-free Korean 
Peninsula should be the top priority of U.S. policy in the region.    
Accordingly, this thesis contends that the Bush administration miscalculated in its 
policy on North Korea by letting its hard-line ideology cloud its better judgment on what 
is the most feasible and prudent policy vis-à-vis North Korea.  So, what now?  What 
should the U.S. policy toward North Korea be going forward?  Given the events in the 
last year or so, this paper makes the assumption that North Korea, because of the 
miscalculations by the Bush administration, already possesses nuclear weapons.  Indeed, 
the CIA has made formal statements saying that North Korea, in essence, already 
possesses nuclear weapons.5  The intelligence service believes that conventional 
explosives tests, conducted since the 1980s, have allowed the North Koreans to verify 
that their nuclear designs would work. The agency believes North Korea has one or two 
nuclear weapons similar to what the United States dropped on Hiroshima during World 
War II.    
Given these circumstances and the policy options available to the Bush 
administration, the best course of action and the most elegant solution to this messy 
problem, is to adopt a policy of unifying the two Koreas.  A reunified Korea would 
satisfy most U.S. interests and would solve the most pressing and dangerous problem: the 
nuclear issue.  Granted, it is not the most optimal option and there are some potential 
drawbacks but, nevertheless, it is the best option available.  In this scenario, there is no 
“good” option; one has to choose the “least-worse” policy option.  In essence, the U.S. 
has to make the best of a bad situation. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See article by Lumpkin, John “CIA: North Korea verifies nuclear designs,” The Washington Post, 9 
November 2003, pg. A.10 
4A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 The overarching research question this thesis hopes to answer is whether a U.S. 
policy of unifying the two Koreas is the best option available and whether it will 
eliminate the North Korean nuclear and terrorist threat to the U.S. and the international 
community, and overall better serve the U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula 
and in the East Asian region.  The thesis will answer this question by addressing issues 
such as:   What are U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula and the East Asian 
region?  What are the U.S. policy options and its consequences?  What is North Korea’s 
true motivation?  What does South Korea want?  What is China’s role and interests?  
What is Japan’s role and what does it desire?   
 To provide background, the next section of Chapter I will provide a chronology of 
events that has led to this standoff.  In order to lend context to the current situation, 
Chapter II of the thesis will examine the relationship between the U.S. and Korea before 
and after its division.  Although this chapter will provide some historical background on 
Korea, its main focus is to analyze the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the 
two Koreas.  This chapter will examine the rationale and the motivation behind the 
establishment of the two Koreas in the chaotic aftermath of World War II.  It will then 
analyze the evolution of events that has led to the current situation.   
Chapters III and IV will analyze the geopolitics of the Northeast Asia region from 
a cultural and historical context and provide conclusions on the intricate relationships 
between the two Koreas, China, and Japan.  It will examine the renewed alliance between 
South Korea and China and its implications for the balance of power in the East Asia 
region.  It will then explore Korea’s complicated relationship with Japan and examine 
Japan’s role and interests in the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear standoff.   
 Chapter V will examine the U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula 
where, since the mid-twentieth century, North Korea has presented the principal regional 
threat and is the key to maintaining regional peace and stability.  Deterring threats to U.S. 
security and maintaining regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia are enduring U.S. 
goals in the region.  To that end, maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula 
should be the top priority of the U.S. policy toward North Korea.  The Bush 
5administration’s actions, however, do not seem to advance this notion.  Indeed, the Bush 
administration, at least on the surface, seems to have resigned themselves to a North 
Korea with nuclear capability.   
Next, Chapter VI will analyze the major U.S. policy options available for North 
Korea:  1) the hard-line policy, as espoused by the Bush administration; 2) the 
engagement policy, the Clinton administration’s policy; and 3) the proposed policy of 
reunifying the two Koreas.  These three broad policy options will be examined and 
evaluated using the United States’ national interests as the key criteria.   
Chapter VII will offer a detailed implementation strategy for the unification 
approach.  The implementation should be carried out in a carefully planned step-by-step 
strategy in five distinct stages, starting with a covert preliminary step, which is to set the 
stage with China.   The next stage entails making concessions to Pyongyang to stop its 
nuclear program.  This will then be followed by the normalization of relations with 
Pyongyang by the major powers.  In addition, during the next stage, the major powers 
will provide aid and investment to North Korea to modernize and develop its economy.  
Finally, the last stage would involve reunifying the two Koreas under a system of 
confederacy or under some other framework.          
Chapter VIII contains the conclusion and comments on possible future scenarios 
of the Northeast Asia region, in the aftermath of Korean reunification.  The Korean 
unification process will have great implications on the future alliance structure of the 
region.  The on-going process of the Six-Party Talks and the future talks on the 
reunification, with each of the four major external stakeholders (U.S., China, Japan, and 
Russia) trying its best to protect and advance its interests, can be viewed as a microcosm 
of the coming power struggle in the Northeast Asia region.  These talks, on the political 
future of the Korean peninsula, can determine the nature of the regional balance of power 
and to a large extent, determine the future role of the United States in the East Asia 




6B. BACKGROUND    
 The fight for supremacy between two superpowers divided the Korean peninsula 
almost 60 years ago, and today, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, the Korean peninsula remains a hotbed of conflict and instability.  The Korean 
War of 1950-1953 became a national struggle for reunification but it ended in a stalemate 
and devastated both countries.  The war also involved four external powers -- U.S., 
Soviet Union, China, and Japan -- all of which still remain actively involved and exert 
influence to varying degrees, on the Korean peninsula.  National reunification has been a 
permanent struggle for the two Koreas ever since its division in 1945.   
There have been dramatic and profound changes in the international landscape but 
the fundamental problems of a divided Korea still remain today and may have even been 
heightened by the collapse of the Soviet regime.  With the end of the Cold War in 1989, 
North Korea lost Soviet patronage and as a result, lost the security guarantees and the 
economic support that had sustained it for 45 years.  In retrospect, it should not have been 
a surprise that North Korea would attempt to develop nuclear weapons once the Soviet 
Union fell and its security guarantees were lost.   
 
1. Nuclear Brinkmanship 
 Indeed, in 1989, through spy satellite photos, the United States learned of new 
construction activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.  The U.S. intelligence officials 
suspected that North Korea, which had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 1985 but had not yet allowed inspections of its nuclear facilities, was in the early 
stages of building an atomic bomb.6  In response, the U.S. pursued a strategy in which 
North Korea’s full compliance with the NPT would lead to progress on other diplomatic 
issues, such as normalization of relations.  As a result, in May of 1992, for the first time, 
North Korea allowed a team from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), 
then headed by Hans Blix, to visit the facility at Yongbyon.  Over the next several 
months, North Korea repeatedly blocked inspectors from visiting two of Yongbyon’s 
                                                 
6 See Kim’s Nuclear Gamble, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/frontline/shows, last accessed on 
August 2003 
7suspected nuclear facilities.  As a result, Blix announced that the agency can no longer 
provide “any meaningful assurances” that North Korea was not producing nuclear 
weapons.7   
In April of 1994, North Korea raised the stakes and announced it was going to 
move its stock of irradiated fuel from its five-megawatt reactor and reprocess the fuel 
from the reactor, which would give North Korea enough plutonium to develop five or six 
nuclear weapons.8  In response, the Clinton administration decided that it would take 
every possible action to try to and stop the North Korean nuclear weapons program.  The 
Clinton administration considered a surgical air strike on the Yongbyon facility but 
concluded that the consequences would be catastrophic if a war would break out (the U.S.  
military commander in South Korea at the time, General Gary Luck, estimated that a war 
on the Korean peninsula would have killed nearly a million people including 100,000 US 
troops).9   
The administration instead decided to impose U.N. sanctions, which North Korea 
saw as a declaration of war, since the U.N. was a signatory on the Armistice Agreement.  
In response, North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames” and vowed to 
have a “total war” if the U.S. preemptively attacks Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities.  The 
situation was worsening by the day and the U.S. prepared for a possible war.  It is under 
this context that former President Carter, despite opposition from some members of the 
Clinton administration, traveled as a private citizen on a peace mission to North Korea.  
Carter met with Kim Il-sung and brokered a deal that would allow the inspectors back in 
and for North Korea to go back to the negotiation table.  In July of 1994, however, Kim 
Il-sung died suddenly of a heart attack.  He was succeeded by his son Kim Jong-il, who 
had been linked to terrorism against South Korea, including a 1983 bomb that killed four  
 
                                                 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Laney, James T. and Shaplen, Jason T., “How to deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2003 
8government ministers and a 1987 blast aboard a South Korean airliner that killed 115 
civilians.  It is important to note that Kim Jong-il was also the founder of the Yongbyon 
nuclear complex.10   
 
2. 1994 Agreed Framework 
 It is under this backdrop that the controversial 1994 Agreed Framework was 
negotiated.  As part of the agreement, North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon 
complex and cease plutonium production.  In return, the U.S. agreed to construct two 
modern light-water reactors to alleviate North Korea’s energy problems.  Additionally, 
the U.S. agreed to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the 
construction on the light-water reactors was completed.  When the deal was announced, 
many Congressional Republicans were outraged.  Critics claim that the deal was 
“appeasement” and “blackmail” because it rewarded North Korea for bad behavior.11   
Since the Agreed Framework was only an agreement and not a treaty, Congress did not 
get a chance to ratify it, an outcome which did not make many senators happy and 
contributed to the antagonistic relationship between the Clinton administration and the 
Senate.  With increased opposition from Congress, the Agreed Framework muddled 
along with no firm commitment from the Clinton administration or the Congress.  As a 
result of strong opposition from Congress and continued defiance by North Korea (it had 
launched a missile test over Japan on 31 August 1998), the Clinton administration 
essentially walked away from the deal.12 
The Clinton administration, however, continued to engage diplomatically with 
North Korea to normalize its relations.  In 1998, after North Korea fired a medium-range 
missile over Japan, President Clinton appointed the former Secretary of Defense William 
Perry to conduct a thorough review of U.S. policy toward North Korea.  The main 
                                                 
10 See Kim’s Nuclear Gamble, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/frontline/shows, last accessed on 
August 2003 
11  See transcripts of PBS Frontline interview with William Perry, former Defense Secretary in Clinton 
administration, can be accessed on www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline, February 2003, last accessed on 
August 2003 
12 See transcripts of PBS Frontline interview with Charles Kartman, member of the Special Envoy for 
Korean Peace Talks in 1998,  can be accessed on www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline, February 2003, last 
accessed on August 2003 
9recommendation in Perry’s 1999 report titled, Review of U.S. Policy Toward North 
Korea, was to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs through 
negotiation and diplomacy.  His conclusion was that the U.S. had no other option, save 
war.13 
In October 2000, Secretary of State, Madeline Albright visited North Korea, 
becoming the highest ranking U.S. official to visit Pyongyang.  It was a feel-good 
moment in the nascent relationship between North Korea and the U.S. and the images of 
Secretary Albright having toasts with Kim Jong-il were televised worldwide.  The 
prospects for normalization of the relationship looked promising, especially in light of the 
progress made by South Korean president Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” a policy of 
engagement with the North for which Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.14  Kim 
Dae-jung visited Pyongyang in June 2000 for a summit with Kim Jong-il and was 
welcomed warmly by the Kim regime and the North Korean people.15  After the 
successful visit, the Koreans and the international community were hopeful of a peaceful 
reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.16       
 
3. Continued Nuclear Brinkmanship 
 Despite these advances, however, suspicions of Pyongyang’s true intentions 
remained.  Conservative hardliners in Washington as well as Seoul believed North 
Korea’s aggressive behavior stemmed from its ultimate goal of uniting the two Koreas 
under the communist flag and subjugating the South under the North, using weapons of 
mass destruction to achieve its goals.  Pyongyang’s past record of terrorism, sponsorship 
of other terrorist states, and violation of human rights, made the engagement policy very 
                                                 
13  See transcripts of PBS Frontline interview with William Perry, former Defense Secretary in Clinton 
administration, can be accessed on www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline, February 2003, last accessed on 
August 2003 
14 For full coverage, see Wehrfritz, George, and Lee, B.J., “Korea’s Mr. Sunshine Kim Dae-jung wins 
the Noble Peace Prize:Can this lifelong democrat unify Korea?,” Newsweek (International ed.), 23 October 
2000, pp.62 
15 For full coverage of the visit, see French, Howard, “2 Korean leaders speak of ‘making a day in 
history’,” New York Times, 14 June 2000, pg. A.1 
16 For commentary on the visit and the prospects for unification, see Sims, Calvin, “Summit glow fades 
as Koreans face obstacles to unify,” New York Times, 22 June 2000, pg. A.8 
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hard to defend.  As such, when the Bush administration, with its neoconservative views, 
took over in 2001, the U.S. policy changed dramatically.   
President Bush halted all diplomatic efforts with North Korea until a thorough 
policy review was conducted by his administration.  Intelligence reports indicated that 
North Korea may have restarted its nuclear weapons program.17  Then, in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush labeled North Korea as a member of the “axis-of-evil” 
in the State of the Union address.18 
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited North Korea in October 2002 and 
presented undeniable evidence of North Korea’s highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) nuclear 
program.  In a stunning admission, the Kim regime confessed to the program.19  
Following the admission, in December of 2002, North Korea announced to the world that 
it was restarting its frozen plutonium-based nuclear program at Yongbyon.  This was 
much more disturbing in that they can process plutonium much faster than uranium and 
once it is up and running, they have the capability to produce five to seven plutonium-
based nuclear weapons in six months.  North Korea watchers and nuclear experts 
estimated that North Korea could have up to six or seven plutonium-based nuclear bombs 
by the end of 2003.20  In October of 2003, North Korea announced to the world that they 
now have the capability of “nuclear deterrence,” alluding to the fact that they now have 
nuclear capability.21 
The CIA has made formal statements saying that North Korea, in essence, already 
possesses nuclear weapons.  The intelligence service believes that conventional 
explosives tests, conducted since the 1980s, have allowed the North Koreans to verify 
                                                 
17 Laney, James T., Shaplen, Jason T., How to Deal With North Korea, Foreign Affairs, New York, 
March/April 2003 
18 See transcripts from the 2002 State of the Union address, available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 29 January 2002, last accessed on 
August 2003 
19 See Laney and Shaplen, 2003 
20 See William Perry interview, Feb 2003 
21 Sohn, Jie-Ae, “NK Ready to Unveil Nuclear Deterrence,” CNN, 16 October 2003, www.cnn.com, 
last accessed on October 2003 
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their nuclear designs would work. The agency believes North Korea has one or two 
nuclear weapons similar to what the United States dropped on Hiroshima.22 
 
4. The Six-Party Talks 
 The first round of the Six-Party Talks ensued on 27-29 August 2003 in Beijing.  
The two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia concluded three days of talks in 
Beijing with seemingly little progress towards the ultimate goal of eliminating North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.   During the talks the U.S. delivered its unequivocal 
and united message that it will not tolerate a nuclear Korean peninsula.  In response, 
North Korea used the multilateral forum to deliver a message that it possesses nuclear 
weapons and the capabilities to deliver them, and that it intends to prove so to the world 
by conducting a nuclear test.  North Korea also stated its long-standing position that it is 
willing to end its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a security guarantee, energy 
assistance, and diplomatic recognition from the United States. Washington, however, has 
remained steadfast in its stance that North Korea must first act to verifiably and 
irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.23   
The second round of Six-Party Talks was held from 25-28 February 2004 with no 
real progress.  Many reports have indicated that it was a tactical victory by Pyongyang in 
the way it has crafted the talks into an excuse to do nothing.24   Furthermore, North Korea 
watchers contend, the U.S. is playing into Pyongyang’s calculations to stall the talks until 
the November elections to see if they could get a better deal with a new administration, or 
worse yet, to give itself eight more months to continue its development of nuclear 
weapons.25  Indeed, the third round of the talks, held from 23-26 June 2004 in Beijing, 
                                                 
22 Lumpkin, John, “CIA: North Korea verifies nuclear designs,” The Washington Post, 9 November 
2003, pg. A.10 
23 Kwak, Tae-Hwan, The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation and Policy Recommendations, 
International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, Canada, 16 March 2004.  Also see, Hwang, 
Balbino Y., The “Six-Party Talks: Much Ado About Nothing,” The Heritage Foundation, Research and 
Analysis, can be accessed at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm333.cfm 
24 See (author unattributed), “No Surprise From North Korean Talks,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Hong Kong, 11 March 2004 
25 See (author unattributed), “North Korea Waits for Kerry,” Christian Science Monitor, Boston, MA, 
5 March 2004;  Also see Magnier, Mark and Demick, Barbara, “Pyongyang May Stall During Nuclear 
Talks, Hoping for Better Deal for a New President,”  Los Angeles Times, 25 February 2004 
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showed little progress.  The U.S., however, was seen as softening its stance when it 
offered Pyongyang a series of incentives, including a significant infusion of foreign aid.  
The Bush administration had previously insisted on complete disarmament as a first step 
to improved relations and aid.  It was reported that Washington was prodded by China, 
South Korea, and Japan to abandon in hard-line stance.26  Then, in July 2004, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell met with North Korea’s Foreign Minister in what was the highest 
level meeting between the two countries in two years.  The meeting lasted for about 20 
minutes and both sides tried to clarify its positions on proposals advanced during the third 
round of the Six-Party Talks in June.  From all indications, however, there was no real 
progress to speak of as North Korea remained guarded and did not offer any 















                                                 
26 See Marquis, Christopher, “Powell Meets Foreign Minister of North Korea to Discuss Arms,” New 
York Times, 2 July 2004. 
27 See Marquis, Christopher, “Powell Meets Foreign Minister of North Korea to Discuss Arms,” New 
York Times, 2 July 2004 
13
II. U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS 
 For more than half a century, the United States and South Korea have been united 
in a strong alliance, albeit an unequal one, that mutually benefited both countries.  In part 
due to this alliance, geographically and symbolically, in the heart of the strategic 
crossroads of the Cold War, the U.S. was able to prevail over the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War and become the unquestioned economic and political hegemon in the East Asia 
region and the world.  South Korea benefited greatly as well, developing from a poor, 
agrarian, authoritarian state into a modern, democratic state with the eleventh largest 
economy in the world, largely as a result of riding on the economic coattails of the United 
States.  However, with the increasing economic prosperity of South Korea and the 
progressive policies of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which took office in 2003, 
coupled with the Bush administration’s penchant for unilateralism, this once rock-solid 
alliance is showing signs of deep cracks.  
Indeed, the anti-American sentiment in South Korea is reaching very disturbing 
levels.  According to a Gallup Korea survey of 1,054 adults, South Koreans now view the 
U.S. most negatively just behind Japan and well ahead of its Cold War enemies, Russia, 
China, and North Korea.28  This rising anti-American sentiment could potentially 
jeopardize the future of the U.S.-South Korea relations.  So, what is the source of this 
sentiment?  It can be argued that it has been fermenting for some time due to the unequal 
nature of the relationship between the two countries.  The fact that it has come to the fore 
in the last couple of years may be due to the Bush administration’s inclination toward 
unilateral action.    
The intent of this chapter is to highlight past U.S. policies toward South Korea 
and comment on the resulting evolution of the relationship between the two countries.  
Toward that end, this chapter will argue that the strained relations between the two 
countries, if left unchecked, will provide a strategic opportunity for China to bring South 
Korea back into its sphere of influence.  Indeed, there are indications that this is already  
                                                 
28 The poll indicates 53.7 % has negative image of the U.S., 58.6% for Japan, 37% for North Korea, 
24.1% for Russia, and 23.6% for China.  For more info, see Kim, Choong-nam, “Changing Korean 
Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Asia Pacific Issues, East-West Center, 
Honolulu, HI, April 2003, No. 67 
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happening.  This dramatic shift in alliance relations can have lasting repercussions on the 
East Asia region and will be a severe blow to U.S. efforts to neutralize China’s growing 
power and influence in the region.         
 
A. IN THE BEGINNING:  U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS IN THE 19TH 
CENTURY 
 East Asia was “opened” by Western Imperialism in the mid-19th century.  
Interestingly, the biggest and the most powerful country was the first to succumb, as 
China was forced to sign the unequal treaties when it lost the Opium Wars of 1839-42.  
Japan was next to submit to Western powers with the famous or the infamous, depending 
on one’s views, landing in Edo by Commodore Perry in 1853 and the subsequent unequal 
treaties imposed on the Japanese.  Of the three countries in Northeast Asia, Korea was the 
last to give way but finally signed its first international treaty in 1876, not with a Western 
power but with Japan, which was trying to emulate the Western powers by imposing 
unequal treaties on its neighbors.  Korea’s descent into the vortex of imperial rivalry was 
quick after that as Japan imposed a Western-style unequal treaty, giving its nationals 
extraterritorial legal rights and opening several Korean ports to international 
commerce.29    
The United States’ treaty with Korea followed in 1882 but not without great 
resistance from the Koreans who were intent on remaining closed to all foreign 
intrusions.  Official American interest in developing formal relations with the kingdom of 
Korea dates from the 1840s, but little was done until William H. Seward’s tenure as 
Secretary of State in the mid-1860s.30  The expansionist Seward wanted to open up 
Korea to advance U.S. interests and authorized efforts to approach the Korean 
government.  After the successful opening of Japan by Perry, the U.S. first formally tried 
to open up Korea in 1866, when the heavily armed, merchant schooner, General 
Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang.  Despite warnings from the  
                                                 
29 Cumings, Bruce, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, pg. 
87 
30 See Chang, Gordon H., “Whose ‘Barbarism’? Whose ‘Treachery’?  Race and Civilization in the 
Unknown U.S.-Korea War of 1871”, The Journal of American History, March 2003, pp. 1331-1365 
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Koreans to turn back, the Sherman forged ahead and fired upon the hostile crowds that 
had gathered on the shore.  When the ship got grounded by low tide, the Koreans killed 
all its crew in battle and burned the ship.31   
The U.S. retaliated in 1871 with a mission headed by Fredrick Low, the newly 
appointed minister to China and a former congressman and California governor, to 
negotiate a treaty with the Korean kingdom.  By this time, the U.S. government decided 
to open Korea by force, and in what many historians term as the “forgotten Korean 
war,”32 ensued.  In this the “Little War with the Heathens,” as the New York Herald 
called it at the time, the Low mission included the warships Monocacy and Palos, plus 
four steam launches, and twenty boats, conveying a landing force of six hundred and 
fifty-one men, of whom one hundred and five were marines.33  Fighting ensued and in 
the end, 650 Koreans died but not before putting up a courageous fight.  Commander 
Low thought that the Koreans fought back with a courage “rarely equaled and never 
excelled by any people,” and thought that “there was something irrational in their 
fighting.”34  This may be one of the reasons why the Americans did not go back to Korea 
until 1882 when the U.S. and Korea successfully concluded a treaty of “amity and 
commerce,” which was the first between Korea and a Western power.  Admiral Robert 
Shufeldt, the leader of the 1882 expedition, hoping to not repeat the mistakes of the Low 
mission, was much more conciliatory toward King Kojong.  The result was the U.S.-
Korea Treaty of Amity and Commerce of May 22, 1882, which was relatively benign and 
can be viewed as comparatively enlightened considering the level of submission in other 
countries’ treaties with Western powers during this period.35     
In many respects, these first formal U.S. encounters with Korea and its ensuing 
treaties and relations that followed represent an important point of analysis for 
subsequent U.S.-Korea relations in the post-Cold war period.  First, one can argue that 
the U.S.-Korea relations today, as was the case during the late 19th century, can be 
                                                 
31 Cumings, 1997, p. 97 
32 For a full treatment on this war see Chang, March 2003, pg. 1331 
33 See Cumings, 1997, p. 97 
34 See Chang, 2003, p. 1355 
35 See Olsen, Edward A, Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course?, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002, p. 8 
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characterized as primarily a one-way, unequal relationship, with the U.S. dictating the 
terms and Korea, having no choice but to follow them.  The divergent views on the 
reunification of the two Koreas and the fact that it still remains a divided nation, long 
after the end of the Cold War, is a testament to the unduly strong influence that the U.S. 
exerts over South Korea that persists to this day.  From all indications, the two Koreas 
want to be re-unified, so there is no valid reasons, in this post-Cold War security 
environment, that Korea should have remained a divided nation, save for U.S. interests in 
the region.  Due to various reasons, U.S. foreign policy has undermined Korean efforts to 
create a unified Korea, and to encourage a new paradigm for Korea.36  Indeed, Korea 
experts have commented critically on the lack of “normalization” of relations between 
U.S.-Korea since the first encounters during the 19th century and continuing to this day.37   
The lessons of the 1866 conflict and the 1871 war show the unyielding resolve 
and defiance of the Korean people to submit to foreign encroachments into its territory.  
Some sympathizers to the North Korean cause have even compared U.S. attempts to 
“open” Korea in the 19th century to its recent efforts to deal with, or “open” North 
Korea.38  Indeed, the North Korean regime can be compared with the Korean “Hermit 
Kingdom” of the 19th century -- not in terms of the alleged terrorist acts or other unsavory 
behavior, but in the manner of its closed society in relation to the rest of the world.  In 
dealing with North Korea, the U.S. can draw upon many lessons from the 1871 clash and 
the much more conciliatory encounter that led to the first U.S.-Korea treaty in 1882.  The 
Low mission of 1871 went into Korea with its guns blazing and its assumptions about 
Korean barbarism and American moral superiority.  The very premise of the mission, 
which aimed to force Korea to join the “civilized” nations of the world in regularized 
intercourse, was that Korea occupied not just a backward legal position, but an inferior 
moral position.39  Moreover, it was assumed that the U.S. represented advanced 
civilization in a system of international relations in accord with the natural order.40 What 
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38 See Cumings, 1997, p. 95 
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resulted was a bloody battle in which the Koreans “fought like demons” and 650 Koreans 
were killed.  Consequently, the Low mission failed to impose any treaties on Korea and 
largely due to this experience, the U.S. did not return to Korea for more than a decade.  
 Conversely, the Shufeldt mission of 1882 was much more diplomatic in its 
approach.  In a letter to King Kojong before his mission, Shufeldt expressed his wish to 
bring about an “amicable intercourse” between the two countries, which “owing to a 
misunderstanding had been unfortunately interrupted,” as he wrote in oblique reference to 
the 1871 conflict.41 As such, the end result for Shufeldt was diplomatic success, not war.  
Of course, it is much too simplistic to compare the events of 1871 to the current North 
Korean nuclear crisis.  Nevertheless, the self-righteous attitudes and the tone of the 
rhetoric of the 1871 mission and the attitudes and rhetoric of the current Bush 
administration seem eerily similar.  If there are any lessons to be learned, it is that the 
Koreans, whether they are North or South Koreans, have a deep sense of pride that comes 
from thousands of years of Confucian heritage.  As the Shufeldt mission of 1882 has 
revealed, showing proper respect for Korea, as a sovereign nation, can go a long way 
towards achieving one’s goals.              
 
B. U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
 Understandably, the U.S.-Korea relations during the Japanese occupation of 
Korea represent an odd period for both countries.  The U.S., as was the case with other 
Western powers, became bystanders as Japan, China, and Russia fought over Korea.  In 
surprising fashion, Japan was victorious over both China and Russia and claimed the 
rights to the Korean peninsula, signaling its arrival as a major power on par with the other 
Western powers.  Accordingly, the U.S., itself trying to establish a colonial stature in 
Asia, leaned in favor of Japan over Korea’s cause.  The U.S. went as far as signing an 
agreement with Japan for mutual acknowledgement of its respective interests in the 
Philippines and Korea.  As such, there were no real U.S.-Korea relations to speak of 
because the U.S. formally recognized Japan’s colonial rule over Korea.  As E.A. Olsen 
writes, “…the U.S. rather blatantly sold out Korea and complied with Japanese desires 
                                                 
41 See Chang, March 2003, p. 1362 
18
for a free hand in its backyard.  U.S. actions can be viewed as pragmatic in light of U.S. 
imperial goals of the day…..Yet it is difficult, if not impossible, to see these policies as 
ethically or morally principled.  Korea was used by the U.S. as a means to an end, 
thereby sacrificing it to Japanese interests.”42  In the extreme, one could argue that the 
U.S. was complicit in this injustice and should be viewed accordingly, especially from 
the Korean viewpoint.      
For the Koreans, it represented a period of disgrace and humiliation for the 
country.  The Japanese deemed the Koreans as uncivilized and barbaric and attempted to 
expunge its culture, forcing them to adopt Japanese names and speak the Japanese 
language.  Strategically, Japan exploited Korea to support its imperialistic thrust into 
China and the Pacific and forcibly recruited millions of Koreans as soldiers and laborers 
for its war machine, as well as 100,000 to 200,000 teenaged “comfort women” who were 
provided to the Japanese soldiers for their sexual enjoyment.43  Needless to say, the 
Japanese occupation of its country was a very traumatizing event for the Korean people.          
Adding to the deterioration of U.S.-Korea relations was the fact that many 
Koreans fought in Japanese uniforms against the U.S. during World War II and that the 
Korean industrial base and labor was critical to the Japanese war effort.  Commenting on 
Korean involvement with Japan against the U.S., E.A. Olsen writes, “To be sure, U.S. 
leaders got word that Koreans should not be held accountable for Tokyo’s actions 
because the Korean nation was a captive nation operating as puppet of Japanese policy.  
Nonetheless, there was enough residual U.S. ambiguity about the precise degree of 
Korean victimization versus the extent to which some Koreans had become voluntary 
participants in Japan’s aggressive game plan.  The possibility existed that many Koreans 
were collaborators—thereby fostering the idea that there could be Korean versions of the 
Quisling and Vichy underlings.”44   
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In sum, the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Korea during this painful 
period for the Koreans was pretty much non-existent and Korea scarcely registered on the 
U.S. foreign relations agenda.   
 
C. THE DIVISION OF KOREA 
 The prevailing theme of U.S. relations with Korea in the post-World War II years 
is that of diplomatic neglect shown by the U.S. toward Korea.  Seemingly always caught 
between the two “whales,” the “shrimp,” or the “big shrimp” as it has been upgraded to in 
recent times, Korea has always been an afterthought in U.S. foreign relations.  Even in 
the heyday of Western imperialism in the 19th century, Korea was an afterthought in the 
overall scheme of expansionism by the Western powers.   
In planning for the post-World War II future of Korea and Japan, the U.S., 
Britain, and China had declared in the Cairo Conference of 1943 that “in due course, 
Korea shall be free and independent,” and at the 1945 Yalta Conference President 
Roosevelt proposed a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship over Korea.  Beyond these words, 
there was no agreement among the wartime allies and no practical planning in 
Washington about the postwar future of the Korean peninsula.  It was reported in 1945 
that Secretary of State Edward Stettinius did not even know the geographical location of 
Korea and had to ask somebody.45   
These events along with the Potsdam conference on postwar negotiations toward 
the end of World War II, when Korea was not even mentioned, reflects the level of 
woeful diplomatic neglect of Korea by the U.S. and other major powers.46  As Gregory 
Henderson, a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and noted Korea scholar, wrote in 
1974, “No division of a nation in the present world is so astonishing in its origin as the 
division of Korea; none is so unrelated to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself 
at the time the division was effected; none is to this day so unexplained; in none does 
blunder and planning oversight appear to have played so large a role.  Finally, there is no 
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division for which the U.S. government bears so heavy a share of the responsibility as it 
bears for the division of Korea.”47   
Moreover, Bruce Cumings writes, “There was no historical justification for 
Korea’s division: if any country should have been divided it was Japan (like Germany, an 
aggressor).  There was no internal pretext for dividing Korea, either: the thirty-eighth 
parallel was a line never noticed by the people of, say, Kaesong, the Koryo capital, which 
the parallel cut in half.  And then it became the only line that mattered to Koreans, a 
boundary to be removed by any means necessary.  The political and ideological division 
we associate with the Cold War were the reasons for Korea’s division; they came early to 
Korea, before the onset of the global Cold War, and today they outlast the end of the 
Cold War everywhere else.”48       
In the end, what divided Korea was the United States’ interest in Japan and 
planning for its occupation, and the relative disinterest in Korea.  Accordingly, Japan 
found itself reconfigured into the cornerstone of an emergent U.S. strategy for containing 
the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region.  Korea, by contrast, again became a 
victimized innocent bystander.49    
 
D. THE COLD WAR YEARS 
 With the division of Korea, the U.S. and Korea became inextricably tied to one 
another.  Still, the U.S. was slow to take its role seriously.  As a case in point, the Soviets 
moved swiftly to occupy all the major cities north of the 38th parallel after the 
demarcation was established.  The U.S., however, arrived in Inchon harbor on 8 Sept 
1945, almost a full month after the Soviets crossed the border into Korea.50  After 
training and equipping a formidable North Korean army, the Soviets withdrew their 
troops in 1948.  The U.S. withdrew its troops in 1949, leaving behind a lot of material 
and about 500 military advisers.  The U.S. did not help the South Koreans very much and 
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consequently, the South Koreans were far behind the North in development of its military 
and industrial base.  To compound the situation, the Americans undertook a massive  
downsizing and restructuring of the U.S. military in the aftermath of World War II.  
Again, South Korea did not figure prominently in the United States’ plans and little 
attention was paid to South Korea’s plight.   
Unfortunately, it was not until the Cold War started heating up in Europe, and the 
Soviets had solidified North Korea’s military and its infrastructure that the U.S. started 
taking its role more seriously in South Korea, albeit slowly.  Provocations from the North 
from as early as 1946 indicated a serious threat but the invasion still caught the 
Americans off guard.  The causes of the invasion are still hotly debated.  Soviet records 
show that, on at least two occasions in 1949, Stalin turned down Kim Il-sung’s request 
for an invasion, but in early 1950, he approved the war plan due to “changed international 
situation.”51  One of the reasons that is attributed to the changed Soviet stance, are the 
statements made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, which excluded South Korea from 
the U.S. defense perimeter.52  It was most likely a combination of events that triggered 
the Korean War.  Still, it serves as just another example of South Korea being victimized 
by diplomatic neglect on part of the Unites States. 
The Korean war and its aftermath led to profound changes in the U.S.-Korea 
relations.  It led the U.S. to shift decisively away from post-World War II disarmament to 
rearmament to stop Soviet expansionism.  The war firmly established the Cold War and 
brought Korea to the center of global attention.  South Korea now stood as a symbol of 
U.S. democracy and its fight against Communism.  With its role in South Korea no 
longer questioned, the U.S. cemented its relationship with South Korea in its fight against 
China, the Soviet Union, and Communism.  As a result, South Korea became a willing 
client state of the U.S., which was now seen as the rescuer of South Korea.  Conversely, 
North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union were now seen as the mortal enemies of South 
Korea.   
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For most of the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods, South Korea has 
welcomed and even encouraged increased U.S. interest and commitment.  South Korea, 
like many other countries in Asia, has a vital interest in keeping close economic and 
security relations with the United States.  The U.S. has been the largest market for the 
export-oriented South Korean economy and has provided South Korea with security, a 
critical contribution to its continued economic success.  South Korea recognizes the 
importance of U.S. power and leadership in world politics and regards close relations 
with the U.S. as the backbone of its foreign and defense policies.   
 Recently, however, there have been deep divisions between the two countries on 
how to deal with North Korea and other security matters.  These deep divisions can have 
lasting repercussions in the delicate balance of power that exist in Northeast Asia.     
 
E. CURRENT U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS 
 The election of Roh Moo-hyun as president in December 2002, in an upset win 
over the more powerful Grand National Party candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, marked a 
watershed moment in, what has become, as of late, a very contentious relationship 
between the U.S. and South Korea.  Roh’s main campaign platform was to seek a more 
independent and equal relations with the U.S. and to continue engagement policies with 
North Korea, despite U.S. call for tougher measures against North Korea’s nuclear 
posture.  In pre-elections speeches, Roh denied that he wanted to end the half-century 
alliance with the U.S. but he did declare that “we should proudly say we will not side 
with North Korea or the United States.”53 Moreover, he suggested that in the event of a 
war between North Korea and the U.S., South Korea might attempt to mediate.54  
Political analysts predicted that once these comments got out, Roh would have no chance 
to win the elections.  Indeed, there was some criticism but surprisingly, the Korean public 
embraced his tough talk against the U.S. and elected him president.   
In many ways, it should not be surprising that, given its economic prosperity and 
increased world standing and given the history unequal and abnormal relations with the                                                  
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U.S., South Korea is beginning to question its relationship with the United States.  Thus, 
Korea’s strong anti-American sentiments played itself out on the biggest stage in Korean 
politics, the presidential elections, where an unknown liberal candidate without any 
political experience, running on the theme of gaining “independence” from the United 
States won the presidential election.  Roh’s election should have served as a forceful 
wake up call to the Bush administration to focus more of its attention on South Korea and 
to attempt to bring South Korea back into the fold.  The anti-American sentiment is 
reaching disturbing and possibly unacceptable levels in South Korea today and should be 
a cause for serious consternation to the Bush administration.   
The causes of this fissure are many.  First and foremost, it is the result of 
“abnormal” relations throughout the history of U.S.-Korea relations, starting from the 
1882 unequal treaty, to the Japanese-controlled Korea during the Japanese occupation, to 
the division of Korea and its subsequent client state relationship during pre and post-Cold 
War periods.55   
Secondly, the proclivity toward unilateralism by the U.S. has thoroughly 
undermined South Korea’s attempt to become a more equal partner in the security of its 
own country.  Indeed, during the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration 
prepared military options for use against the North without ever consulting the South 
Koreans.56  In the current North Korean nuclear crisis, the Bush administration has 
explicitly refused to rule out any option, and seem unconcerned about Seoul’s desires.  
Senator John McCain is on record as saying, “While they may risk their populations, the 
U.S. will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people.  And 
spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism.  We would prefer the company 
of North Korea’s neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must.”57   
Third and lastly, it is clear that the North Korean issue has brought to the forefront 
the thorny issue of South Korean sovereignty and its desire for full freedom and 
independence “in due course,” as promised in the Cairo Declaration of 1943.  This issue                                                  
55 For a full treatment on the topic of “abnormal” relations, see Olsen, 2002, p. 7 (Chapter 2: Tracing 
U.S.-Korea Abnormality) 
56 See Milbank, Dana, “U.S. Open to Informal Talks with N. Korea,” The Washington Post, 30 
December 2002, p. A4 
57 McCain, John, “Rogue State Rollback,” Weekly Standard, 20 January 2003 
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of Korea “independence” has manifested itself in growing public sentiment toward North 
Korea and the possibility of reunification.  Adding fuel to the fire, the Bush 
administration’s uncompromising policies toward North Korea has tended to  
undermine South Korea’s ambitious engagement efforts with Pyongyang.  Conversely, 
Roh is on record as saying that “In no circumstances will we cut our dialogue with North 
Korea.”58 
The North Korean issue has become a larger-than-life issue for many Koreans.  
There are many reasons for this sacrosanctity of reunification in Korean society.  Besides 
the ethnic and cultural homogeneity between the two Koreas, many Koreans still have 
close family members on the other side of the DMZ since the war ended half a century 
ago.  For most of them, they do not even know if their loved ones are still alive.  And 
many are known to have passed away with the deepest pain and regret imaginable.  Many 
newlyweds were known to have been separated during the war and many of those have 
not remarried since, hoping to be reunited with their spouses someday.59  Ever since Kim 
Dae-jung embarked on his “Sunshine Policy” to re-unify the two Koreas, there have been 
reports of romantic sympathy and feel-good stories in both North and South Korea.  
Crying has become a ritual whenever Koreans of North and South meet, as was witnessed 
in several occasions in peace delegation meetings in Pyongyang.  The North Koreans, 
including many small children who may not understand the complex ramifications of 
division and reunification between the two Koreas, burst into tears during the official 
farewell ceremonies for the departing South Korean delegates.  Some romantics go as far 
as believing that North Korea will not use a nuclear bomb to attack South Korea even if it 
develops one because the people of South and North are compatriots.60   
It is against this backdrop that the Bush administration took office and went about 
changing its North Korean policy in a dramatic fashion.  The inclusion of North Korea as 
one of the members of the “Axis of Evil” further undermined Korean efforts and 
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alienated a large share of the Korean public and government officials.  Thus, it is 
understandable that the level of anti-Americanism has reached such high levels.         
Adding to the complex nature of the relationship is the Pentagon’s plan for a 
broad force restructuring which includes withdrawing 12,500 troops from South Korea 
and moving 8,000 U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone and out of Seoul.61  The 
South Korean government has pleaded with the U.S. to pull its troops out more gradually, 
for fear of sending a signal of lack of resolve to North Korea.  As an indication of the 
level of mistrust, there is widespread speculation among the South Korean population 
that the U.S. is moving its troops away from the DMZ and out of harm’s way in 
preparation for military strikes against North Korea.   
 
F. IMPLICATIONS 
 The continued strained relations between the United States and South Korea can 
have far-reaching repercussions in the delicate regional security arrangement in Northeast 
Asia.  However surprising or naïve it may seem, the South Koreans (the public and the 
government, to a lesser degree) have lost their fear of Communist regimes in North Korea 
and China.  To these North Korean sympathizers, the Bush administration and the U.S., 
at least according to poll results, is now the enemy who are trying to block Korean 
reunification and the ultimate independence and freedom of a united Korean nation.  Of 
course, these views may only be a short-term trend and South Korea may once again 
become a loyal ally of the United States.  Indeed, some Korean scholars have noted that 
concerns were also raised about Kim Dae-jung when he took office, and yet he ended his 
presidency as perhaps the most pro-American president in Korean political history.62   
Nevertheless, a top priority in the United States’ East Asia policy should be to 
sustain a strong U.S.-Korea relationship and continue to maintain a strong U.S. influence 
on the peninsula as well as the region.63  It is essential to achieving U.S. objectives on the 
                                                 
61 Gertz, Bill, “South Korea Troop cuts tied to restructuring,”  The Washington Times, 21 June 2004 
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Koran peninsula, especially a potential unified Korea.  The interests of China, Japan, 
Russia, and the United States will likely continue to intersect on the Korean peninsula, 
which has become the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia.  As such, China, Japan, and 
Russia have sought to control the Korean peninsula for centuries for strategic dominance.  
China, as the nearest peer-competitor to the U.S. poses the biggest threat for the U.S.  It is 
critical for the U.S. to maintain a strong regional influence to neutralize China’s growing 
power.  To maintain influence essential to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in the short 
and long terms, a prudent U.S. policy would support South Koreans and seek to retain a 
strong U.S.-Korea political, economic, and security relationship. 
If the U.S. continues to undermine South Korea’s efforts for reunification and for 
a more equal relationship, however, it may drive a permanent wedge between the 
traditional loyal allies.  The effects of the fallout can have profound implications on the 
delicate security balance in the Northeast Asia region, which, with the emergence of 
China as a potential superpower, will probably become one of the most dynamic 
economic regions in the world.  The national interests of the U.S. in the region will only 
increase in the future.   
If the U.S. fails to “Koreanize” some of its South Korean foreign policies, South 
Korea will gravitate toward China.  Indeed, there are indications that this is already 
happening as China has become a critical economic partner for South Korea.  In 2003, 
China surpassed the United States as South Korea's largest export market.  Bilateral trade 
between China and South Korea was worth $63.2 billion in 2003 and is expected to reach 
$100 billion within the next year or two.64  Meanwhile, direct investment in China, as 
reported by the Korean government, totaled $1.72 billion in 2002.  This constitutes 34 
percent of South Korea's total outward foreign direct investment, and has overtaken the 
U.S. for the No. 1 spot.65 According to Chinese statistics, which include local 
reinvestment, South Korea's investment in China came to an even larger $2.7 billion in 
2002.66  For those who argue that Korea will always be a client state of the U.S. due to its 
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economic dependence, these statistics should serve as a sobering reminder that China’s 
export market is just as valuable to the South Koreans as the United States’ market.   
Another sobering reminder is that 55% of South Koreans that were surveyed view 
China positively versus only 37.2% for the United States.67  Of course, these statistics 
alone cannot undo more than 50 years of loyal alliance between the U.S. and South 
Korea.  Still, it does serve notice that China will be more than happy to fill the void left 
by the U.S. and get South Korea back into its sphere of influence.  A South Korea more 
aligned with China than with the U.S. offers a potentially very unsettling scenario for the 
Korean peninsula and the region.  A re-Siniczed South Korea could potentially pave the 
way for the reunification of the two Koreas under Chinese guidance, and without any 
meaningful role or influence from the United States.  This would spell disaster for U.S. 
relations with a unified Korea, which would forever view the United States as the villain 
which kept its country divided for its own selfish purposes for over half a century.  For 
the region, it could potentially inflame old rivalries with Japan and cause an outbreak of a 
nuclear arms race.  It would pit Korea and China against Japan.  With its security 
threatened, Japan would have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons of its own.  The 
role the U.S. would play in this scenario remains a question mark.  Would it join Japan in 
its competition against China and Korea?  Would it pull out of Northeast Asia altogether 
leaving Japan in the lurch?   
These are interesting questions to ponder but decidedly unfavorable ones.  The 
U.S., with enough foresight, should never let it get to that point.  The current unrest in 
South Korea, after over half a century of U.S. presence and dramatic shifts in geopolitical 
conditions, is a sure sign that U.S. needs to do something revolutionary on the Korean 
peninsula before the situation worsens. 
                            
G. SUMMARY 
 After more than 50 years of being a loyal client state of the U.S., South Korea is 
no longer satisfied with playing the role of “little brother” to the U.S.’s “big brother” role.                                                   
67 Kim, Choong-nam, “Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK 
Alliance,” Asia Pacific Issues, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI, April 2003, No. 67 
 
28
As evidence of this discontent, the South Koreans voted into office as president a very 
liberal candidate who advocated for more equality in its relationship with the U.S. and 
continued reunification efforts with North Korea, despite contrary views by the Bush 
administration.  Moreover, there are disturbing levels of anti-American sentiment that 
threatens future military presence in South Korea and the overall relations between the 
two countries.  The genesis of anti-American sentiments that is pervasive in Korean 
society today can be traced back to the many flawed U.S. policies that can best be 
characterized as woeful neglect, at best, and at worst, morally unjustifiable.  The resulting 
relationship is that of a forced client-state relationship and a grudging partnership.   
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III. CHINA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN KOREAN 
REUNIFICATION 
 Reflecting the profound changes in the geopolitics of the region and possibly 
foreshadowing the beginnings of new political order in East Asia, there is a China craze 
going on today among the South Koreans.68  In the eyes of many in the Asia-Pacific 
region, China, oddly enough, has suddenly become the good guy.  Conversely, having 
tired of Washington’s penchant for unilateralism and overbearing influence, especially in 
its hard-line policies against North Korea and ending the hopes of a reunification, many 
Koreans now view the U.S. and its role in foreign affairs in an increasingly negative 
manner.  Indeed, according to the Gallup Korea survey of 1,054 adults, South Koreans 
now view the U.S. most negatively just behind Japan and well ahead of its Cold War 
enemies, China, North Korea, and Russia.69  Additionally, 55% of those surveyed view 
China positively versus only 37.2% for the United States.70  Nonetheless, many South 
Koreans still have not forgotten that China fought against the South Koreans in the 
Korean War.  Additionally, the fact that China is still a communist regime and may have 
ulterior strategic motives, still trouble many Koreans and government officials.       
As China emerges as a great power in East Asia, as well as the world, South 
Korea’s position is typical of many Asian countries:  hopeful yet apprehensive, excited 
and a little scared at the same time, and mainly encouraged to see the balance of power 
shifting, albeit slowly, away from the U.S. and Japan and towards its traditional patron.  
However, given China’s history of questionable human rights record and its anachronistic 
political system, it is questionable whether China will emerge as a positive or a negative 
force in the region.  Still, most East and Southeast Asian countries are hopeful that China 
will, at the very least, neutralize some of United States’ hegemonic power in the region.    
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China’s emergence as a potential superpower and a peer-competitor to the U.S. 
brings up many intriguing scenarios and implications.  Toward that end, the purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the state of China-South Korea relations and evaluate China’s 
role and interests in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as a possible 
Korean reunification.  Given its common history and shared heritage it is only natural 
that South Korea has gravitated toward China, in light of its strained relations with the 
United States.  Beijing has also coveted a stronger alliance with Seoul, in order to bolster 
its position vis-à-vis the U.S. in the East Asia region.  A China-South Korea alliance, at 
the expense of the U.S., will provide strategic geopolitical opportunities for both 
countries to advance its interests.  Consequently, this new alliance, if it comes to fruition, 
will alter the fundamental security structure of East Asia.     
This chapter will present three arguments to support the case that given current 
U.S. policies toward the two Koreas, a shift in alliances may be in the offing.  First, in 
order to lay the theoretical groundwork, the balance of power theory will be analyzed and 
applied.  The realism theory of international relations advances the notion that states will 
act to even out the balance of power if it gets too tilted in favor of a hegemonic power.  
Indeed, the U.S., as the unquestioned leader in the East Asia region has seen its influence 
and prestige slip in the last couple of years due to various reasons.  Second, South Korea 
will rebel against the increasingly unilateral doctrinal policies of the current Bush 
administration regarding the North Korean security and unification policies.  Third, 
China’s long, historical bond with Korea will bring them closer together, especially if it is 
in its geo-economic and geo-political interests to do so.  The chapter will conclude with a 
section on the implications of such a scenario and what the U.S. can do to protect its 
interests on the Korean peninsula and the region. 
 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 
 In order to better understand why China approaches the international system the 
way it does, a brief survey of realism is in order.  The theory of structural realism 
attempts to provide fundamental insights about world politics and state action by 
explaining the order or the “structure” of the international system.  The structure of the 
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international system is defined first and foremost by its organizing principle, which is 
anarchy.71  As opposed to domestic systems which are centralized and hierarchic, 
international systems are decentralized and anarchic.  In this environment, where there is 
no recognized central authority figure, everybody is left up to their own devices and 
anarchy vice hierarchy, becomes the ordering principle of an international system.   
According to Kenneth Waltz,72 the father of structural realism, the international 
structure is the principle determinant of outcomes at the systems level.  The structure 
encourages certain actions and discourages others.  For Waltz, understanding the 
structure of an international system allows us to explain patterns of state behavior, since 
states determine their interests and strategies on the basis of calculations about their own 
positions in the system.  Waltz’s structural theory has one major dependent variable, 
which is the war-proneness of international systems.  This attribute can be best explained 
by the polarity of the system, which is an independent variable of the theory.  The theory 
resides entirely at the system level: war-proneness is a system property, and polarity is a 
structural characteristic of the system.73  And most importantly, balancing is a key 
outcome, the most common dynamic in this system.   
Moreover, anarchy encourages states to behave defensively and to maintain rather 
than upset the balance of power.  The first concern for states is to maintain its position in 
the system.  When this system gets upset, such as when one state obtains too much power 
or when great powers behave aggressively, the potential victims usually balance against 
the aggressor and thwart its efforts to gain power.74   In sum, balancing checkmates 
offense.  Furthermore, Waltz argues that great powers must be careful not to acquire too 
much power, because excessive strength is likely to cause other states to join forces  
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against them, thereby leaving it worse off than it would have been had it refrained from 
seeking additional increments of power.75  With this survey of structural realism as a 
backdrop, its salience for China can be explored.   
 
1.       Structural Realism in the Current International Context 
 In many respects, this dynamic describes the dilemma that the U.S. is facing 
today, and explains to a certain extent, the emergence of China as a potential peer-
competitor to the United States.  With the demise of its traditional Cold War adversaries, 
the U.S. has become the unquestioned economic and political leader of the international 
community.  It follows reason, then, that the U.S. should hold more sway over other 
nation states.  According to the structural realism school of thought, however, that is not 
the case.  Rather, it advances the notion that the other nations will band together to try to 
neutralize the United States’ hegemony.  Indeed, the fierce international opposition, even 
from some long-established U.S. allies, to a U.S proposal for military action in Iraq, is a 
perfect example of the balancing dynamic that is currently being played out.  The 
subsequent unilateral action by the U.S. and the ensuing international backlash, even in 
light of overwhelming U.S. military victory, only reinforces the notion of an anarchic 
order and the balancing mechanism of the international system.    
The case applies equally well in the East Asia region, where the U.S. has, with the 
end of World War II, established itself as a major power in the region, and with the end 
of the Cold War, as the region’s most influential actor.  The U.S. presence in Northeast 
Asia, both economically and politically as well as culturally, is pervasive throughout.  
One cannot go into Seoul, Tokyo, and even Beijing without seeing the all-encompassing 
influence that the U.S. has on the region.  The U.S., in little over 50 years since the end of 
World War II, has achieved unprecedented power in East Asia.  With great power, 
however, as Waltz has pointed out, comes the inevitable backlash and attempts by other 
states to balance the system and bring it back to its rightful anarchic order, vice a 
hierarchical order.   
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Indeed, there is evidence that this is already occurring.  Recognizing the need to 
reassert itself in the region, China embarked on a new Korea policy formally establishing 
diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992.  For China, it was a step towards 
gradually edging out U.S. influence and establishing its own on the Korean peninsula.76  
For Korea, it was a very practical move both politically and economically.  Since then 
both countries have gone through its respective economic miracles and have forged even 
closer ties.   
There are those, however, who believe in the “status quo-ness” of Chinese foreign 
relations policy, that Chinese diplomacy is more accepting of extant international 
institutions, international norms, and U.S. dominance of the international and regional 
power structures than any time since 1949.77  Waltz would argue, however, that the 
balancing dynamic is an independent variable, an inherent trait of the international 
structure where anarchy is the ordering principle.  In other words, “balancing” in the 
international system is deterministic and is not of free will.  In that sense, the 
international structure is sufficiently constrained that China would have no choice but to 
act as a balancer.  The fact that the U.S. is the lone superpower, the realist would argue, is 
only a temporary state and a country or a coalition of countries (at least in a temporary 
coalition for a higher cause) such as the European Union, will rise to challenge the U.S. 
hegemony.    
Meanwhile, in what can be construed as an act of “balancing,” South Korea’s 
relations with the U.S. have suffered.  Due mainly to recent events regarding the 
accidental killing of two Korean girls by a U.S. tank, as well as the two countries’ 
divergent views on reunification efforts, anti-American sentiment is rampant in Korea.  
South Korean anti-Americanism has emerged from the confines of radicalism and has 
invaded the realms of mainstream Korean political discourse.  Further, the creation of a 
viable democracy in South Korea has allowed a reinterpretation of Korean history and a 
reevaluation of the Korean national identity.  This reflection of its own history and the 
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role the U.S. has played in it along with the increasingly overbearing nature of U.S. 
security policy toward the Korean peninsula, has dramatically altered the view of the U.S. 
in the minds of both the elder and younger generation in today's South Korea.   
Thus, the second argument is that the continued diplomatic neglect and 
unilateralism will drive South Korea toward new alliances, mainly with China.     
 
B. SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA’S RENEWED ALLIANCE 
1. The Original “Big Brother” 
 China for centuries had been the ultimate superpower in East Asia and reigned 
supreme over all other East Asian nations, with the possible exception of Japan.  China’s 
history is enormously long.  No other society has maintained or kept so meticulous a 
record of its own doings over such a long span (close to four thousand years) as has 
China.78  No other nation could rival its size, population, resources, statecraft, and 
cultural refinement.  As such, China established a tributary system among East Asian 
nations in which the nations paid “tribute” to China in exchange for diplomatic 
recognition.  In this “Chinese world order,” China’s emperors bestowed the cloak of 
“civilized people” on non-Chinese people who subscribed to China’s view of world, 
which was to recognize the supremacy of China’s emperor and live by the teachings of 
Confucius.  In this regard, Korea and Vietnam were China’s most reliable traditional 
allies.  In exchange, China promised to defend the domains of neighboring kings who 
signed up to China’s world order.   
An elaborate set of diplomatic rules developed over the centuries.  Diplomatic or 
tributary missions shuttled back and forth between the various capitals of the Chinese 
dynasties and Korean kingdoms.  Each time there was a significant event in China, such 
as deaths, birthdays, marriages, Korea’s monarch dispatched a tribute mission to China.  
As Jonathan Spence writes in The Search for Modern China, “The most frequent mission 
were those from Korea, which came every year; Korean visitors mingled freely with Qing 
scholars and officials, and left vivid accounts of the social and cultural life in Peking and 
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of the political attitudes of the Confucian literati.”79  China’s monarchs responded in kind 
and gradually the exchange of tribute assumed the additional role of facilitating trade.  
China’s military and economic supremacy was essential to this world order.  So long as 
China’s hegemony was unrivaled, Korea willingly allowed China to manage its foreign 
affairs.  Confident in Chinese ability to deter or deal with any invaders, Korea did not 
maintain any significant military forces after the 1598 expulsion of Japan’s samurai 
invaders.     
Thus a major theme running through Korean history is the impact of the 
successive waves of Chinese influence that over time made Korea the most thoroughly 
sinicized non-Chinese state in East Asia.80  In fact, many have commented that the 
Koreans are more “Chinese” than the Chinese, a reference to Korea’s still strong 
Confucian culture and China’s rejection of Confucianism in favor of socialist ideology.81  
Indeed, the geographical proximity and the cultural bond that has been established over 
thousands of years, offers very compelling inducement for a future alliance.  Many 
scholars in Korea have written to this effect and seem hopeful that a mutually beneficial 
and trusting relationship can be established with China.82   
Many U.S. Korea watchers and academics have also commented on the special 
relationship between the two countries.  Don Oberdorfer writes, “Of the major powers, 
China had by far the greatest influence and was the most acceptable to the Koreans….the 
Korean kings embraced Chinese culture, paid tribute to the Chinese emperor, and 
received recognition and a degree of protection in return.”83  Hence, the broad theme 
running through the China-Korea relations in pre-Japanese occupation period is that of a 
willing “big brother, little brother” relationship.   
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2. The Fall of China 
 The Chinese world order crumbled with the arrival of Western imperialists in the 
19th century.  China’s defeat in the Opium and Arrow Wars and the ensuing Western 
encroachment and influence precipitated a string of events that eventually led to the fall 
of China’s traditional imperial order.  With their defeat, China was forced to adopt a 
Western style of international trade and relations.  It could no longer impose its tribute 
system on foreign states.  The tribute system was the cornerstone of Chinese foreign 
policy and its belief that the “Son of Heaven” was the link between the universal order 
and all of humanity, not just the Chinese.  It was a sobering period for both China and 
Korea, which would no longer have the “big brother” to protect it from foreign 
encroachment.  Indeed, Korea fell into the hands of Imperial Japan after it had defeated a 
severely weakened China over the rights to Korea.   
The ensuing demise of China also brought on a very unstable and painful period 
for the Koreans as well.  Whether it is by coincidence or due to some other factors, the 
periods of prosperity for both countries have come during periods of strong alliance 
between the two countries.  Conversely, the periods of hardship have also coincided with 
periods of separation between the two countries.  Although there have been many 
complaints about the abuse of power by the Chinese, all would agree that in retrospect, 
the period under Chinese patronage was relatively peaceful and prosperous time for the 
Koreans.   
 
3. Toward a More Equal Alliance 
 Although the burgeoning China-ROK relationship has transpired into a feel-good 
story for the citizens of both countries, there are still lingering issues that need to be 
addressed.  First and foremost, at least in the minds of the South Koreans, is the nature of 
the relationship and whether it will take on the “big brother, little brother,” patron-client 
relationship of the past or if it will take on a more equitable form.  After serving as a 
pawn for the major powers for nearly all its history, South Korea, on the basis of its 
economic strength, finally seems as though it can stand on its own, as an independent, 
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sovereign nation.  Toward that end, from all indications, South Korea seems intent on 
establishing, at the very least, an equal relationship with China.  The recent dispute over 
the ethnic origin of the ancient Korean Goguryeo Kingdom offers a glimpse of the new 
dynamic in this budding relationship.84   
In January of 2004, Chinese academics taking part in a government-run project, 
released documents that claimed Goguryeo as an ethnic kingdom of ancient China.  The 
claim seems to be an effort to ward off future border disputes with a potential unified 
Korea.  As soon as the Chinese made this claim, the condemnation by Korea, both North 
and South, was swift.  While officials in Beijing claim that the dispute is purely a matter 
for academic debate, the Koreans took it more personally and its outrage boiled over into 
a national campaign to protest China’s claim.  Moreover, it seems to have reinvigorated 
Korean nationalism on part of both North and South Koreans.  The Goguryeo issue and 
other issues of Korean nationalism such as changing the spelling of Korea back to its 
original “Corea” form and changing the name of Sea of Japan to the East Sea, seem to 
have increased ethnic bonding between the two Koreas.  The implication is that South 
Korea and especially a unified Korea will no longer tolerate a lesser status in its 
relationship with China.   
 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF A STRONG SOUTH KOREA-CHINA ALLIANCE 
 The burgeoning China-ROK relationship coupled with the continued strained 
relations between the U.S. and South Korea can have far-reaching repercussions in the 
delicate regional security arrangement in Northeast Asia.  If the U.S. continues to 
undermine South Korea’s efforts for reunification and for a more equal relationship, it 
may irrevocably damage the relations between the traditional loyal allies.  Many regional 
experts have noted that the foreign policies of the current Bush administration have 
validated South Korea’s already suspicious view that Washington has no true desire for  
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Korea reunification.  Beijing, on the other hand, is perceived in a much more positive 
light, with most South Koreans viewing China’s role as accommodating and contributing 
to the ultimate goal of reunification.85       
Meanwhile, as if its affection for superpower states is a zero-sum game, South 
Koreans now view the Americans with increasing suspicion.  As an indication, 55% of 
South Koreans that were surveyed view China positively versus only 37.2% for the 
United States.86  Even more disturbing is that 39 percent of Koreans now view the U.S. 
as their biggest national security threat versus only 33 percent who view North Korea as 
the biggest threat.87  South Korea’s political liberalizations, its meteoric economic 
ascendancy into the upper ranks the world’s economies, along with its flourishing trade 
with China, have fed the perceptions in South Korea, perhaps falsely, that it can now 
stand on its own, without Washington’s strong hand in its political, security, and 
economic affairs.  As a result, China’s rising share in Korea’s external economic and 
political relations will inevitably constrain Korean political cooperation with the U.S. in 
the event of future U.S.-China confrontations.88   
For the region, a strategic alliance between Seoul and Beijing could potentially 
inflame old rivalries with Japan and could alter the underlying security structure in the 
region.  Leaders of both China and Korea have vivid memories of the Japanese 
aggression and remain wary of Japanese intentions.  Seoul is as vocal as Beijing in its 
criticism of Japan’s increasing militarism and its “whitewashing” of its imperial history.  
Beijing has been firmly on the side of Seoul in its disputes with Tokyo.  In 1996 Beijing 
quietly expressed its sympathy for Seoul when it supported South Korea in its territorial 
dispute with Japan over Tokdo/Takeshima Island.89   While some countries in Asia see 
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Chinese power as a potential threat, South Korea to some extent welcomes it as a balance 
against its closer and potentially more powerful Japanese neighbor.90   
Still, the South Korean public as well as the lawmakers are notoriously fickle and 
political sentiments can turn in an instant, as evidenced by the heated and emotional 
disputes over the ancient Goguryo kingdom that has threatened to undo twelve years of 
diplomacy-building.  In a survey early in 2004, eighty percent of South Korean 
parliament members said China was South Korea's most important economic partner. By 
contrast, in a survey of lawmakers in August of 2004, after China’s claims of the 
Goguryo Kingdom became public, only 6 percent of the respondents showed a similar 
esteem for China.91  Now, Korean editorialists and scholars routinely warn South 
Koreans about Sinocentrism, the rise of Chinese nationalism and the return of a Middle 
Kingdom to dominate Asia.  “The anti-U.S., pro-China atmosphere has changed recently 
as we saw the hegemonic side of China,” a prominent professor commented.92  Another 
scholar commented, “…anti-China sentiments could quickly lead Korea to take a pro-
U.S. stance and cooperate more with Japan…the recent China bashing in South Korea 
should be harnessed into a new opportunity not only to rethink China's strategic 
intentions toward the Korean Peninsula but also to dispel the self-centered ‘China 
fantasy’ many of us have held up to now.”93   
As a further sign that the tide of South Korean sentiment may be turning back 
toward the U.S., the Chairman of the liberal-leaning, ruling Uri Party, Shin Ki-nam, 
reaffirmed Seoul’s loyalty to Washington in July 2004, commenting, “We have 
demonstrated our loyalty and friendship not only with our words, but with our 
actions…even after an innocent young Korean civilian was kidnapped and brutally 
murdered by a terrorist group in Iraq, we have stood by our commitment to send 
additional South Korean soldiers to Iraq.”94  Seoul sent a five-member delegation to 
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Washington, D.C., New York and Los Angeles to “explain and clear up some 
misunderstanding” over the changing relationship between the two nations and to 
“consolidate and reinforce” the alliance, and to reinforce the understanding that, “we 
need each other.”95 
Nevertheless, the courtship of Seoul by Beijing is genuine and should be taken 
seriously by Washington.  In order to maintain a strong alliance with Seoul, Washington 
needs to reaffirm its commitment to South Korea, as Seoul has done with its delegation, 
and firmly establish itself as a more dependent and beneficial ally than other major 
powers.  As shown by the recent events, Seoul is not completely comfortable with the 
prospect of a multi-dimensional alliance with the PRC.  In order for the U.S. to 
strengthen its ties to Seoul, it needs to improve its consideration of Seoul’s security 
interests and desires in its foreign policy formulations.  This means giving Seoul a greater 
say in U.S. troop restructuring as well as reunification efforts with North Korea.             
        
D. SUMMARY 
 China’s relationship with South Korea has undergone profound changes over the 
past century.  In some regard, their fates seem intertwined with one another.  Both have 
gone through tragic episodes in its nation’s history, mainly as a result of foreign 
encroachments, and have emerged as stronger nations.  Throughout most of the 20th 
century both countries established separate alliances, mainly out of need for political 
survival rather than any common bond it shared with its Cold War alliances.  Beginning 
in 1992, however, with normalization of their relations, China and Korea have embarked 
on a new relationship that has washed away Cold War paradigms and re-invoked its past 
relationship, albeit on a much more equal setting.      
Moreover, after more than fifty years of being a loyal client state of the U.S., 
South Korea is showing signs that it is no longer satisfied with playing the role of “little 
brother” to the U.S.’s “big brother” role.  As evidence of this discontent, the South 
Koreans voted into office a candidate who advocated for more equality in its relationship 
with the U.S. and continued reunification efforts with North Korea, despite contrary 
                                                 
95 Kang, 2004 
41
views by the Bush administration.  Moreover, there are disturbing levels of anti-
American sentiment that threatens the future U.S. military presence in South Korea and 
the overall relations between the two countries.  The genesis of anti-American sentiments 
that is pervasive in Korean society today can be traced back to the many flawed U.S. 
policies that can best be characterized as woeful neglect, at best, and at worst, morally 
unjustifiable.   
The strained relations between the U.S. and South Korea, if left unchecked can 
have lasting repercussions.  China will try to seize upon the opportunity to advance its 
strategic goals and attempt to bring South Korea back into the Sinic realm, which will 
irrevocably alter the delicate balance of power that exists in Northeast Asia today.  The 
courtship of China and Korea, however it may turn out, is real and should be taken 
seriously.  How the alliances shift due to this renewed relationship will depend largely on 
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IV. JAPAN’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN KOREAN 
REUNIFICATION 
Despite enormous advances in the bilateral relationship between South Korea and 
Japan, the recent news from Seoul that the chairman of South Korea’s dominant Uri Party 
will resign after disclosures that his father was a collaborator during the Japanese 
occupation of the Korean peninsula, underscores the painful and the powerful memories 
that still linger in the minds of most South Koreans.96  It highlights the antagonistic 
nature of South Korea and Japan relations, even after almost sixty years after Japanese 
defeat in World War II and the end of Japanese occupation of Korea.  South Korea and 
Japan have much in common – same enemies and friends, social and cultural affinity 
(they may even be the same people in terms of their common ancient origins), shared 
security interests, and similar political and economic objectives – so a natural alliance 
and strong bilateral relations would be expected.   
The nature of the relationship, however, is still largely defined by past Japanese 
aggressions against Korea, particularly the three decades of Japanese colonial rule in 
Korea from 1910 to 1945.  Korea’s (both North and South) unwillingness to forgive and 
Japan’s often patronizing attitude toward South Korea, has prevented the two countries 
from establishing strong bilateral relations.  As a result, the two countries are linked by 
its alliance with the U.S. but still remain largely distrustful of one another, although the 
relations have improved considerably in the last decade.  Indeed, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, and as some regional experts have commented, South Korea-Japan 
cooperation has grown steadily over time in both frequency and depth.97      
The thorny issue of Korea-Japan relations has played a significant role in the 
fragile nature of power balances in the Northeast Asia region, and has taken on added 
importance in the last eighteen months as the U.S. and other major stakeholders attempt 
to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.  Indeed, the ongoing Six-Party Talks to resolve 
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the North Korean nuclear crisis has been marred by talks of North Korean abductions of 
Japanese citizens, and Pyongyang’s demands to bar Japan from participating in the talks, 
because it believes Tokyo is not trustworthy.98  So, what is the nature of Korea-Japan 
relations and how does it affect Japan’s role and interests in the possible reunification of 
the two Koreas?  The reunification of the two Koreas will result in a fundamental 
structural transformation of security relationships in the East Asia region.  How the major 
powers handle this process will ultimately determine the nature of future security 
cooperation and formation of alliances.  This chapter will attempt to explore these 
questions and the diverse scenarios that could come about as a result of changing 
geopolitics, and present conclusions about Japan’s role and interests on the Korean 
peninsula.     
 
A. HISTORY OF KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS 
The current state of Korea-Japan relations is the result of a long and storied 
history and interaction between these two proud countries.  Due to its intense rivalry, the 
two countries’ shared histories are of much debate and argument.  Because of the legacy 
this history has for Japan’s contemporary policy toward Korean reunification, it is worth 
reviewing the historical roots of the dispute.  At the forefront of this controversy is the 
debate regarding the origin of the Japanese people. 
 
1. All in the Family?:  The Protohistory of Japan 
In a scenario reminiscent of the premise of the book and the movie, “Planet of the 
Apes,” where the dominant, “intelligent” apes discover that the “dumb,” inferior humans 
were the forebears of its civilization, there is a growing and mounting, if not 
overwhelming, evidence that the Japanese culture and race may have descended from 
Korea, much to the dismay of Japanese conservatives.  The evidence, both 
anthropological (bones) and archaeological (artifacts) suggests that migration from the  
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Korean peninsula began about 2,400 years ago with perhaps a few hundred people from 
the southern tip of the Korean peninsula crossing the Korea Strait to the Japanese island 
of Kyushu.99   
The aboriginal Jomon people of Japan, in 400 B.C., were primarily hunter-
gatherers, who still used stone tools.100  This is in contrast to mainland East Asia, just 
across the Korea Strait where, by this time, China already had developed intensive 
agriculture more than six thousands years ago and which Korea had used for over 2,000 
years.  Around 400 B.C., however, archaeological finds on the Japanese island of Kyushu 
of metal tools and full scale agricultural tools, suggest a dramatic shift to a new mode of 
living for the Jomon people.101  Archaeological excavations reveal that the agriculture 
came in form of irrigated rice fields, with canals, dams, banks, paddies, and rice residues.  
The pottery found during this period, termed the Yayoi period,102 reveal distinct 
similarities between Korean pottery and the new Jomon pottery.  Many other elements of 
the new Yayoi culture were unmistakably Korean and previously foreign to Japan, 
including bronze objects, weaving, glass beads, and styles of tools and houses.103   
The farming culture spread quickly from Kyushu to the adjacent main islands of 
Shikoku and Honshu, reaching what is now the Tokyo area within 200 years.104  
Northern Honshu, however, was abandoned by the farmers because they could not 
compete with the Jomon hunter-gatherers.  For the next 2,000 years, northern Honshu 
remained a frontier zone, beyond which the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido 
and its Ainu hunter-gatherers were not even considered part of the Japanese state until its  
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annexation in the nineteenth century.105  In all, the Japanese culture underwent far more 
radical change in the 700 years of the Yayoi era than in the ten millennia of the Jomon 
period.106   
So, who are the modern Japanese more like, the Jomon people or the people from 
the period of Yayoi?  Examination of the skeletal remains of the Jomon and the Yayoi 
people show that the two were very different.  Whereas the Yayoi people resemble the 
modern Koreans and Japanese, the Jomon people were shorter, with more wide-set eyes, 
shorter and wider faces, and much more pronounced facial topography, with strikingly 
raised brow ridges, noses, and nose bridges.107   In all these respects, Jomon skulls differ 
from those of modern Japanese and are most similar to those of modern Ainu, while 
Yayoi skulls most resemble those of modern Japanese.  Similarly, geneticists attempting 
to calculate the relative contributions of Korean-like Yayoi genes and the Ainu-like 
Jomon genes to the modern Japanese gene pool have concluded that the Yayoi 
contribution was generally dominant.108   
Given the empirical anthropological, archaeological, and genetic evidence, it is 
safe to assume that, no matter how unappealing it may be to the Japanese, the Yayoi 
transition represents a massive influx of immigrants from Korea, bringing Korean 
farming practices and culture and overwhelming the Jomon people and its gene pool.            
Yet, many Japanese still cling to the myth of the nation’s divine origins and prefer to 
keep it shrouded in mystery, refusing to listen to scientific evidence.  Even when the 
evidence is presented in an overwhelming fashion as it has been, there is very little media 
coverage among the Japanese.  Indeed, many political commentators have expressed a 
concern for a lack of Japanese awareness on this topic because the mass media has not 
really covered and reported on these findings.109   
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In order for progress and improved relations between South Korea and Japan to 
develop, especially in these times of highly charged security environment in Northeast 
Asia, both countries need to fully realize that they are one of the same.  As Jared 
Diamond concludes in his article, “History gives the Japanese and the Koreans ample 
grounds for mutual distrust and contempt, so any conclusion confirming their close 
relationship is likely to be unpopular among both peoples.  Like Arabs and Jews, Koreans 
and Japanese are joined by blood yet locked in traditional enmity.  But enmity is mutually 
destructive, in East Asia as in the Middle East.  As reluctant as Japanese and Koreans are 
to admit it, they are like twin brothers who shared their formative years.  The political 
future of East Asia depends in large part on their success in rediscovering those ancient 
bonds between them.”110 
 
2. The Origin of Japan’s Imperial Court 
In a statement that was both promising and shocking to the Japanese as well as the 
Koreans, Japanese Emperor Akihito, in December of 2001, all but declared his own 
Korean ancestry.  Speaking of the culture and technology brought to Japan via Tsushima 
(a Japanese island in the Korea Strait), Emperor Akihito said that “it contributed greatly 
to Japan’s subsequent development.”111  Then, he added, “I, on my part, feel a certain 
kinship with Korea,” and went on to cite an ancient chronicle that says the grandmother 
of his eighth century imperial ancestor, Kammu, was from a Korean kingdom.112  Some 
in academic circles were not surprised that the emperor professed his Korean lineage, but 
were taken aback that the Japanese people were shocked at the revelation.  It is widely 
known among academics and regional experts that the Japanese imperial line was a direct 
descendent from the Korean Paekche Kingdom.113  Nevertheless, it was surprising that 
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the emperor said it, and it may be viewed as a way for Japan to extend an olive branch 
and attempt to overcome the bitter historical legacy of Japanese occupation.   
What the emperor announced to the world in December of 2001, and what many 
in close academic and political circles knew, and what is, in 2004, still relatively 
unknown to most of the world, especially Japan,114 is that there is very strong 
archaeological and historical records evidence that the Japanese imperial line is an 
offshoot of the Paekche dynasty which reigned over southwestern Korea for the 1st 
century B.C. to 660 A.D.  The reason why there is no definitive conclusion that everyone 
can agree on, is that it is still very controversial and both sides (or three sides if one 
counts North Korea) have attempted to use it to gain political advantage over the other.  
 What the growing evidence shows, Korean scholars suggest and corroborated, for 
the most part, by Western scientists and regional experts,115 is that the “horeseriders” in 
Japan’s theory on the origin of the modern Japanese, were not the mysterious horsemen 
from unknown origin, and nor were they from Manchuria, but were noble Koreans from 
the Paekche kingdom.  The “horserider” theory was first presented at the “Symposium on 
the origins of the Japanese people and culture and formation of the Japanese state” in 
1948 and postulates that horseriders from a Manchurian imperial race moved through the 
Korean peninsula and into Japan around the second or third century A.D., spreading 
culture and setting the foundation for the development of a modern Japan.   
Korean scholars argue that archaeological evidence and historical documents 
show that the “horseriders” were nobles from the Paekche Kingdom and the first Yamato 
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emperor was in fact a 4th century Paekche prince named Homuda-wake or Onjin.116  Still, 
Japanese academics have been generally reluctant to examine the matter.  The Japanese 
Imperial Household Agency, an arcane and rigid bureaucracy, prefers to leave the origins 
of the Japanese shrouded in mystery and has opposed opening major archaeological sites 
that might offer definitive evidence.117  Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that there is a 
strong kinship between the royalty of Paekche and Yamato, and many other undeniable 
similarities in technology, culture and governmental systems.118  
These revelations have been shocking to many Japanese.  The assertions of a 
superior race afforded a rationale for domination over other Asians by asserting that the 
Japanese had not only had a mandate to uplift their neighbors but, as a superior race, 
could hardly help doing otherwise.119  Some Japanese officials during the Meiji period 
even advanced the argument that they were of the Aryan race because they were able to 
adapt so well to Western civilization.  So superior were the Chinese and other Asians in 
intelligence that they must be related to the Europeans and Americans instead.120  In a 
society where the purity and the superiority of its race were used as a justification for 
Japan’s expansion into East and Southeast Asia, it is not surprising that there is such a 
resistance to this notion.  On a positive note, future alliance building efforts between 
Seoul and Tokyo can look to the shared lineage as the basis for its cooperation, as 
Emperor Akihito attempted to do with his announcement.   
 
 
                                                 
116 Most notably Won-tack Hong of Korea who has published two books on the topic, Relationship 
between Korea and Japan in the early period: Paekche and Yamato Wa, published in 1988 by Pan Korea 
Book Corporation, and Paekche of Korea and the Origin of Yamato Japan, published in 1994 by Kudara 
International.  Also see, Schoenberger, Karl, “Controversial theory traces Japanese emperors’ roots to an 
old Korean town,”  Los Angeles Times, 18 December 1988, pg. 18.  For more recent articles, see 
Wherfritz,George and Takayama, Hideko, “The ties that bind; Japanese are just beginning to come to grips 
with their Korean heritage,”  Newsweek, 18 March 2002, pg. 24.   
117 Schoenberger, Karl, “Controversial theory traces Japanese emperors’ roots to an old Korean 
town,”  Los Angeles Times, 18 December 1988, pg. 18.  For more detail on the archaeological findings and 
similar conclusions, see Covell, Jon Carter and Covell, Alan, Korean Impact on Japanese Culture: Japan’s 
Hidden History, Hollym International, 1986 
118 See Hong, Won-tack, Paekche of Korea and the origin of the Yamato Japan, Seoul: Kudura 
International, 1994, Ch. 3 
119 See Duus, Peter, The Abacus and the Sword:  The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910, 
University of California Press, 1995, pp. 414-5 
120 Duus, 1995, pg. 414 
50
3. Japanese Aggression and Occupation of Korea 
In 1592, with the ultimate goal of conquering China, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
assembled some 200,000 troops and invaded Korea, setting off a bloody war that lasted 
six years.   The Japanese samurai warriors, by some accounts, killed more than one 
million Koreans, which was close to one-third of the Korean population at the time.121 
They also brought back tens of thousands (some say close to 100,000) of noses and ears 
hacked off corpses and live Koreans during their invasion.  Today, there is a 30-foot high 
war memorial in Kyoto where the ears and noses of the Koreans are buried.  The 
mourners, mostly native Koreans and some Japanese, recently gathered at the burial site 
known as the Ear Mound, or Mimizuka, to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the 
site.   
The Ear Mound and the specific events of the 1592 invasion are still unknown to 
most Japanese.  It was until only recently that the Japanese textbooks even acknowledged 
the infamous Ear Mounds.  Today, about half of the high school level textbooks mention 
the Ear Mounds.122   These shameful events, however, are very well known to the 
Koreans.  In the 1970s, then president, Park Chung-hee, proposed to level the Ear 
Mounds because it brought shame and disgrace to the Koreans.123  Needless to say, these 
events, which occurred more than 400 years ago, still serve to fuel the animosity between 
the two countries.   
More than any other event in the history of Korea-Japan relations, though, the 
Japanese occupation of Korea from 1910-1945 has become the defining event in the 
relations between the two countries.  For 35 years, the Japanese occupied Korea and all 
but abolished Korean culture and language, forcing the Korean to adopt Japanese names 
and to speak the Japanese language.  The Japanese justified its occupation the same way 
that the European colonizers justified theirs -- that they needed to bring civilization to a 
racially inferior and uncivilized society.   
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The Japanese, at the time, viewed the Koreans with extreme derision and thought 
of them as almost sub-human.  A Japanese Diet member observed at the time, “If you 
look closely [at the Koreans], they appear to be a bit vacant, their mouths open and their 
eyes dull, somehow lacking...Indeed, to put it in the worst terms, one could even say that 
they are closer to beasts than to human beings.”124  The travel accounts of the Japanese 
during this period describes the Koreans as, “happy-go-lucky, smelly, dirty, pitiful, weak, 
disorderly, barbarous, lazy, and withdrawn; their vices encompassed swindling, larceny, 
gambling, bribery, adultery, viciousness, and intrigue; and their impoverished living 
conditions little or no better than those of primitive aborigines.”125  The travel accounts 
did not so much dehumanize the Koreans as infantilize or primitivize them, likening them 
to the Ainu.  The overwhelming perception was that the Koreans were no more capable 
of taking care of themselves than were any backward people and were to be treated by 
children rather than adults.  What the country needed, the Japanese believed, was a 
“clean-up,” a “grand laundering,” a “sanitization of the slough of inequity that produces 
so many vices and abuses,” and once such a thorough cleansing was done, a “bright 
sunshine and air” would be let into the country.126   
In the end there were two views, the Japanese concluded.  “The first view is that 
the Koreans are a degenerate people full of lies, bereft of moral sense, weak in endurance 
and courage, who will never raise themselves up as civilized people.  The second view 
says that while they may lack a moral sense and courage they are a people by no means 
inferior to the Japanese in industry and endurance, who, if they have the proper 
leadership, will have a bright future.”127  Most Japanese took the second view and went 
about providing the “proper leadership” and thus, the justification for the occupation and 
the genocide of the Korean culture.  To the Japanese, they were helping the Koreans to 
improve themselves; it was not exploiting them.   
For the Koreans, it was a period of disgrace and embarrassment, an event so 
traumatic to a country’s psyche that many Korean historians still refuse to write about it                                                  
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after all these years.  As Bruce Cumings comments, “At the end of another century we 
can say that Koreans have by no means gotten over this experience.  Japanese 
imperialism stuck a knife in old Korea and twisted it, and that wound has gnawed at the 
Korean national identity ever since.  That is the fundamental reason why so little modern 
history is written: and that is what so dignifies those few Koreans and Japanese who have 
stood outside this death urge toward silence and written good history anyway.”128      
 
B. CURRENT RELATIONS 
The news that a native Korean had sacrificed his life to save a Japanese person 
made headlines all over Japan and Korea in January of 2001.  A South Korean language 
student and a Japanese photographer attempted to rescue a drunken Japanese man who 
fell into the subway track in front of a speeding commuter train, but all three died when 
they could not get out in time.  In a society where its citizens are distrustful of foreigners, 
particularly Koreans, the fact that a Korean would give his life to save a Japanese man 
brought remorse and shame to those who held traditional beliefs about Koreans.  
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori attended his funeral and spoke of him as a “role 
model for young Japanese.”129  Education Minister Nobutaka Machimura commented, “I 
think that message recalls for us something which we once used to have, but now we 
don’t have much.”130 
The gestures were sincere and heart-warming but the fact that the Japanese and 
the Koreans were so surprised by the attempted rescue, underscores the disturbing point 
that the two countries still view each other more as enemies than friends.  Still, the 
relationship between South Korea and Japan has made great strides in the recent years,      
and the incident serves as a microcosm of the current state of relations between Seoul and 
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1. Warming Relations  
Despite being allied with the U.S. and confronted with powerful communist 
enemies right on its borders, South Korea and Japan refused to accept each other for 
twenty years after the end of World War II.  They remained that way until 1965 when the 
U.S. brokered a deal to normalize relations between the two vital American allies.131  
Despite the normalization, however, there remained a deep mutual mistrust and the two 
sides remained acrimonious throughout the Cold War.  This was largely due to the 
lingering effects of the occupation, primarily Seoul’s obsession with obtaining a formal 
apology and Tokyo’s refusal to come clean on its past and offer one.  The two countries 
have differing perspectives on the apology issue.  The Koreans feel that the Japanese, by 
whitewashing their past actions, have not shown sincere contrition and cannot be trusted.  
The Japanese, on the other hand, feel that Korea and other Asian countries are too 
shortsighted to understand that post-war Japan is fundamentally different from pre-war 
Japan, and is using the apology issue to extract more aid and undermine Japan’s growing 
political power.   
Although the two countries remained politically distant, South Korea and Japan 
became increasingly dependent on each other for commercial trade.  Japan, in 1999, 
became South Korea’s leading intra-industry trading partner, surpassing the United 
States.132  Besides economic interdependence, there were many other factors that 
dramatically altered the political and security landscape of Northeast Asia and the nature 
of Korea-Japan relations in the 1990s.   The end of the Cold War, the rise of China and 
beginning of a new order in Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea’s 
fledgling democracy, and the election of Kim Dae-Jung, all paved the way for a historic 
summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo in which 
Tokyo issued an unprecedented written apology to South Korea for the occupation of 
Korea.  The statement, signed by both Kim and Obuchi, reads: 
The two leaders concurred that it is important for both countries to face the past 
squarely and develop a new relationship for the 21st century based on mutual                                                  
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understanding and trust and firmly grounded in friendship and cooperation.  Prime 
Minister Obuchi, looking back on the relations between Korea and Japan in this 
century, humbly accepted the historic fact that Japanese colonial rule inflicted 
unbearable suffering and pain on the Korean people and expressed painfully deep 
repentance and a heartfelt apology for the ordeal.  President Kim sincerely 
acknowledged the Prime Minister’s perception of history, expressed appreciation and 
mentioned that it is a necessity of the times that both Korea and Japan make 
concerted efforts to overcome their unfortunate past and build a future-oriented 
relationship based on the spirit of reconciliation and friendship.133 
 
The statement was remarkable in that it was the first time Japan had issued a 
written apology for its wartime actions.  Also noteworthy was the fact that it was 
addressed specifically to Korea and not to any other Asian country.  Needless to say, it 
went a long way toward healing old wounds and setting the foundation for improved 
security, political, and economic relations.  Indeed, Tokyo offered $3 billion in financial 
assistance to Seoul when it was reeling form the Asian financial crisis in 1998.  South 
Korea, in turn, relaxed its trade restrictions on Japanese automobiles and has allowed the 
Japanese to compete with Korean automakers.  Their navies now conduct joint search and 
rescue training exercises.134  Granted, these are only small steps toward establishing a 
true alliance but the gestures were, nevertheless, promising signs to the U.S. that its two 
most important allies in East Asia were finally coming together.   
The co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup took the relationship to another level.  The 
feel-good moment which saw the two historical enemies coming together to host the 
biggest sporting event in the world, had the citizens of both countries buzzing and rooting 
for one another, and politicians calling for renewed vigor in their relationship.  Writing in 
a Japanese political magazine, a Korean official commented, “Never in the history of 
Korea-Japan relations has there been as stirring a moment as this.  It is now the  
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responsibility of the intelligentsia of both countries to ponder with open minds the 
historical significance of having co-hosted the World Cup and to consider how to build 
on this experience.”135   
Still, animosities lingered as Japan continued to send mixed signals regarding its 
Meiji period actions and Koreans still obsessed over Japan’s seeming lack of true 
remorse.  The latest controversy involves the visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the 
Yasukuni Shrine and the revisionist textbook issue.  Much to the dismay of Seoul and 
Beijing, Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to the fallen Japanese soldiers, 
a total of four times since 2001.  But despite the urging of right wing conservatives to 
visit on August 15th, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat, Koizumi never satisfied the 
nationalists’ demands to do so.  Still, he has been much more enthusiastic about visiting 
the shrine than any of his predecessors and as a result, has renewed bitter feeling among 
the Koreans and Chinese.  Regarding the visit, President Kim remarked that Koizumi’s 
visit only sowed mistrust.136  Adding to the bitterness was the publication of a new 
middle-school history textbook which downplays Japanese wartime atrocities.  
Neutralizing some of the effect was the fact that only six school districts out of 532 
nationwide chose to use the book.137  Nevertheless, Seoul was quick to reply as Kim 
commented,  
To our disappointment…some people in Japan are attempting to distort history, 
casting dark clouds over Korea-Japan relations again.  Many conscientious Japanese 
citizens watched with apprehension the distortion of history and their prime 
minister’s paying tribute to the controversial war shrine…How can we make good 
friends with people who try to forget and ignore the many pains that inflicted on 
us?...How can we deal with them in the future with any degree of trust?  Those are 
questions that we have about the Japanese.138   
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Consequently, Seoul halted defense official exchange programs with Tokyo and 
also suspended its Navy search and rescue exercises with Tokyo, although both were 
quickly resumed.  It is clear that, despite the great progress in the last decade, South 
Korea-Japan relations still have a long way to go in order to achieve a trusting 
relationship.  The quick reconciliation, though, testifies to the increased desire and 
commitment of both countries for greater security cooperation.   
                                     
2. The Beijing Factor 
One of the key contributing factors that may facilitate closer South Korea-Japan 
relations is the specter of a South Korea-China alliance or worse yet, of a future united 
Korea-China alliance.  This state of affairs, if it comes to fruition, is seen, by many 
regional experts, as the nightmare scenario for both Japan and the United States.139  
Indeed, a strong alliance between a unified Korea and China would dramatically alter the 
power balance in the region.  This scenario would pit a China-Korea alliance against a 
U.S.-Japan alliance for regional dominance and could possibly lead to a regional arms 
race and severe security ramifications.             
Due largely to the fact that it will intensify the rivalry between the two powers, 
the worsening of relations between Beijing and Tokyo is of special concern to this region.  
The conspicuous omission of an apology to the Chinese when President Jiang Zemin 
made a formal visit only a month after the Kim visit, can be construed as Japan 
distancing itself from China, for various reasons.  First, Japan views China as an 
emerging power and a regional rival, and as a result, a potential threat to Japan, whereas 
Seoul is still not viewed in this manner.  Second, deep mutual distrust still remains 
between the Jiang regime and Tokyo.  This is in sharp contrast to Kim Dae-jung, whom 
Japanese officials praise for his principled approach.  Third, Tokyo is suspicious that 
Beijing is using the apology issue to pressure Tokyo on the Taiwan matter and to bolster 
Chinese nationalism.140  Tokyo’s refusal to offer formal, written apologies in the same 
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manner it did to South Korea, along with Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, has prompted Beijing to withdraw Koizumi’s invitation from a commemoration 
of the 25th anniversary of the peace and friendship treaty, and  Koizumi has been persona 
non grata ever since.141    
How the reemergence of China as a major power plays out in the region will go a 
long ways toward determining the stability of the region.  As in the past, it looks more 
and more like the power struggle between China and Japan will get played out on the 
Korean peninsula.  Seoul and Tokyo could go one of two ways: the two countries could 
be driven apart by Beijing’s assertive courtship of South Korea, or Seoul and Tokyo 
could form an alliance, with full backing from the United States.  Many see the latter 
scenario as the most natural and desired, given the current geopolitical conditions but one 
can just as easily see a Korea-China alliance.   What is not likely to happen is that China 
and Japan will be able to coexist harmoniously and independently, without the formation 
of strategic alliances and security structures.   
Conceivably, South Korea could ally with either China or Japan, but there is too 
much historical enmity between China and Japan for any prospect of a bilateral alliance 
between them.  This leaves Seoul in a familiar and delicate situation of choosing its 
allegiance.  In the past it has sided with China but the U.S. will have a big say and will 
try to steer South Korea toward the U.S.-Japan alliance.  On the other hand, there are 
some East Asia regional experts who suggest that those who portray Sino-Japanese 
relations as sullenly hostile is at least 25 years out of date and that Tokyo and Beijing 
quietly buried the hatchet in the 1970s and have entered into an increasingly close 
alliance.142 Furthermore, they suggest, Americans are too naïve to understand that Japan 
foresees the demise of U.S. hegemony and is hedging itself by courting China to align 
itself with the future superpower.143  As such, the nature of the security structure remains  
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to be seen but it is becoming increasingly apparent that the resolution of the North 
Korean nuclear issue and the possible reunification of the two Koreas will play a critical 
role in determining future alliances.   
 
C. JAPAN’S INTERESTS IN KOREAN UNIFICATION  
Japan’s improved relations with South Korea offer enticing opportunities for 
Tokyo to advance its interests.  Both countries are strong allies of the U.S., share 
common concerns about North Korea, enjoy common values of democracy and 
capitalism, and have no real geopolitical differences over matters such as the Taiwan-
China issue.144  The Japanese have been very impressed with South Korea’s burgeoning 
democracy and its rapid rise as an economic power and as a result, the Japanese public 
opinion of Koreans has improved significantly in the last decade.  Accordingly, there is a 
strong undercurrent among the Japanese to establish better relations with its closest 
neighbor.   
 
1. Japan’s Interests 
Although it maintains a low profile in the North Korea talks, Japan has 
considerable interests at stake in the Six-Party Talks and the possible reunification of the 
two Koreas.  Foremost on Tokyo’s agenda is the matter of security.  When Pyongyang 
launched its Taepodong missile -- a three-stage missile estimated to have a range of 3,800 
to 6,000 km -- over the Sea of Japan in August of 1998, it caught the Japanese off guard 
and prompted vigorous debate over its peace constitution.  The missile launch proved that 
Pyongyang can launch an attack on Japan at any time if it wished.  Just as unsettling was 
the fact that Japan was severely constrained by its pacifist constitution to respond 
accordingly.  As a result, the Japanese parliament enacted new “contingency” laws 
making it easier for its armed forces to respond quickly to attacks at home.145  
Consequently, protecting itself from an unfriendly unified Korea is at the top of the list of 
Japan’s interest on the Korean peninsula.  As a leading Japanese strategic thinker  
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succinctly put it, “Japan seeks a united Korea that is friendly to Tokyo and Washington, 
that is economically viable and politically open, and that will allow a token U.S. presence 
to remain.”146   
Accordingly, second on the list is Japan’s economic and commercial interests on 
the Korean peninsula.  Japan and South Korea have forged a strong bilateral trade 
relationship and have become very interdependent on each other’s economies.  Any 
disruption to this flow could have dramatic effects on their respective economies as well 
as the region’s economic health.  The extensive interdependence of their economies was 
evident in the 1997Asian financial crisis.  Japan contributed billions of dollars to help 
rescue the South Korean economy and thus also cover the exposure of Japanese banks, 
which held more than a third of South Korea’s foreign debt.147     
Third on the list of Tokyo’s interests is the post-Korean unification alliance 
structure and its relationship with the major powers, particularly with Washington.148  A 
strong unified Korea would exponentially increase the complex and delicate nature of 
power balances in the East Asia region.  How the two Koreas reunify and what roles each 
of the major powers play in the process will ultimately determine the new alliance 
arrangement in the region.  For Japan, its primary interest is to maintain its strong 
alliance with the U.S. and to align a unified Korea toward the U.S.-Japan alliance vice 
Beijing.  A unified Korea tilted more toward China than Japan or the U.S. can cause 
severe reverberations throughout East Asia and would force the U.S. to re-think its East 
Asia strategy.  Consequently and more importantly for Japan, such a scenario would 
force the U.S. to re-think its bilateral relations with Tokyo.  It is highly unlikely that 
Japan would be abandoned by the U.S. but nevertheless, a Sino-centric post-unification 
East Asia is not in the best interest of Japan.  With all that is riding on the reunification of 
the two Koreas, one wonders if Japan even desires this outcome.   
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2. What Does Japan Want? 
In a post-Cold War strategic context, Japan realizes that it needs South Korea 
more than South Korea needs Japan, as evidenced by the recent series of overtures by 
Tokyo toward Seoul.  During the Cold War, despite the fact that both were strategically 
aligned with the U.S., neither country made a concerted effort to improve bilateral 
relations with one another.  With the U.S. focused on winning the Cold War, both 
countries were well protected by the U.S. security blanket, so there was no strategic gain 
to be made by improving their bilateral relations, unless of course, they were forced to do 
so by Washington, as was the case with normalizing their relations in 1965.  Victor Cha 
explores this aspect in his book, “Alignment Despite Antagonism,” and puts forth the 
notion of “quasi-alliance,” in which two states (Korea and Japan) remain unallied but 
share a third party (U.S.) as a common ally.149 Cha correlates the perceived level of U.S. 
commitment toward South Korea and Japan to the level of cooperation in their bilateral 
relations and concludes that the less the U.S. commitment, more likely they are to 
cooperate and establish better security relations.   
Indeed, it can be argued that the post-Cold War environment has lessened U.S. 
commitments in the region and in turn, precipitated a dramatic change in the security 
calculations of Tokyo as well as Seoul.150  The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of 
the Soviet Union signaled to both Tokyo and Seoul that they could not continue to rely on 
the security guarantees that came from forward deployments of U.S. troops in Japan and 
Korea.  With a belligerent North Korea at their doorsteps and the rising power of China, 
and the perceived lessening of U.S. commitments in the region, Tokyo and Seoul have no 
choice but to turn to each other.  Indeed, with the recent announcements of a broad 
restructuring of U.S. troops in East Asia,151 Tokyo and Seoul may feel even more 
compelled to establish a strong security alliance.     
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Under this geopolitical context, Japan is stuck between the proverbial rock and a 
hard place vis-à-vis Korean reunification.  On one hand, if Tokyo is perceived to be 
opposing reunification and undermining its efforts, Japan would be characterized as 
attempting to weaken the Korean state to promote its own selfish interests.  On the other 
hand, if Tokyo plays a prominent role in the unification efforts, the other major powers 
would be widely suspicious of Japan’s motives.  Either way, Japan would be criticized 
for attempting to advance its own interests at the expense of others.  This may explain 
why Japan has been very ambiguous in its official position on the Korean reunification 
issue. 
Objectively, however, the Korean reunification issue goes to the heart of Tokyo’s 
strategic calculations on its future role and viability in a new security alliance order in 
East Asia.  Any miscalculations by Tokyo could irreparably jeopardize its vital national 
interests.  Victor Cha puts forth the argument that Japan’s strategic thinking is best 
characterized by the defensive realist approach, which holds that a state’s survival is best 
attained by pursuing just enough power to achieve a balance where no one other power 
can threaten the system or a country’s national security.152  Under this framework, Cha 
concludes that Japan does not oppose unification on the peninsula; actively seeks 
alignment with powers on the Korean peninsula as a hedge against China; seeks to 
engage Korea in order to preempt Korea revanchist inclinations; and seeks to reconstruct 
the “ideational” base of its relationship with Korea (i.e., history).153  Indeed, one can see 
most, if not all of these overtures from Tokyo to Seoul.       
In this regard, a slow process by which Tokyo maintains the status quo as long as 
possible is seen by some Japanese officials as the best way to proceed.  As Armacost and 
Pyle write, “…most Japanese policymakers have quietly concluded that their wisest 
course is not to hasten unification, but rather to pursue a course that maintains the status 
quo of a divided Korea for as long as possible, all the while supporting American policies 
of deterrence, hoping to contain tensions and foster cordial ties with South Korea, and 
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favoring policies that promote a gradual reconciliation rather that a rapid and potentially 
violent reunification, which might produce new problems for Japan.”154   
Such a flexible and accommodative approach could prove effective if it were not 
for China’s growing influence in the region, as evidenced by the leading role it has taken 
on in the Six-Party Talks.  Accordingly, this thesis argues that, instead of maintaining a 
low profile, Japan should take on a more prominent and proactive role in Korean 
reunification efforts.  As risky as it may appear on the surface, the potential benefits of 
such a strategy far outweigh the possible pitfalls.   
Despite fighting against China in the Korean War, South Korea has gradually 
gravitated back toward the Chinese sphere of influence, which should be a very 
disturbing development to both Washington and Tokyo.  The reasons for Seoul to 
embrace Beijing are varied: strained relations with the U.S.; China’s emerging power 
coupled with assertive courtship by China; Japan’s continued displays of nationalist 
views; and most importantly, Seoul’s perceptions that its traditional allies are 
undermining its efforts at reunification.  Whether Beijing’s actions are a calculative 
strategy to advance its interests on the Korea peninsula remains to be seen.  It is readily 
apparent, however, that Beijing has taken on a much more prominent role in Korean 
affairs, particularly the Six-Party Talks, to the surprise of many.  Perhaps Beijing senses a 
strategic opportunity to form an alliance with South Korea and a possible unified Korea.  
Or perhaps, Beijing has just tired of Pyongyang’s antics and wants to solve the North 
Korean nuclear problem once and for all.  Either way, it does not bode well for Tokyo 
and Washington if Beijing succeeds in disarming North Korea and takes the lead in 
reunification efforts.  In this scenario, China would be seen by Koreans as the catalyst in 
reuniting its country and as a result, a unified Korea would be more inclined to be aligned 
with China than with the U.S. and Japan.   
In order to preclude this from happening, Japan, in close coordination with the 
U.S., needs to build on its improved relations with South Korea and openly advocate for 
the reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification of Korea through diplomatic 
means with Japan playing a vital role, would satisfy most, if not all of Japan’s interests.  
A unified Korea aligned with Tokyo and Washington would eliminate Japan’s most 
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immediate security threat and provide the U.S.-Japan-Korea alliance with an upper hand 
in its efforts to neutralize China’s growing power in the region.  Moreover, a peaceful 
merger of the two Koreas will prevent any major disruptions to the region’s economic 
activity and trade.  Finally, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will still have a 
significant military presence in Korea and Japan if the North Korean threat is eliminated.  
 A case could be made that a strong Korea-Japan alliance would obviate the need 
for U.S. military presence in the region.  Instead of forward deployed troops in the 
region, the U.S. could maintain its influence through its strategic alliance with Korea and 
Japan.  If this scenario would play out, one could even make a case that Beijing would 
opt to join the alliance rather than opposing such a formidable coalition.  Indeed, Ralph 
Cossa of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests that a U.S.-
Japan-Unified Korea alliance not only will have a profound impact on the broader 
geopolitical environment but will help define the nature of the U.S.-Japan-China 
relationship and other regional triangles and broader multilateral configurations.155         
In sum, South Korea and Japan have shown great progress in the last decade in 
improving their bilateral relations.  Still, they have a long way to go before they can 
establish a meaningful security alliance with mutual trust and understanding.  In the 
current geopolitical context in East Asia, it is in the critical interest of both Tokyo and 
Washington that Seoul be more aligned with Japan than with its traditional patron, China.  
The implication for the U.S. is that a strong Korea-Japan security alliance would lead to 
enhanced long-term stability in East Asia and as a byproduct, would lessen the security 
burden of the U.S. in the region.    
A surefire way to promote this alliance is for Tokyo to take a more involved and 
constructive role in the Six-Party Talks.  In many respects, the current Six-Party Talks 
can be viewed as a prelude to the Korean reunification talks, with the major powers 
jockeying for position and influence.  This may partly be the reason why the talks have 
bogged down and the reason it has become much larger in scope than just finding a 
resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue.  China has volunteered to coordinate the 
talks and has taken the lead role in trying to resolve the nuclear crisis.  In order to 
neutralize Beijing’s growing influence and courtship of Seoul, Tokyo needs to take a                                                  
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more proactive and sincere role in reunifying the two Koreas as a means to solve the 
North Korean nuclear crisis and to advance its own interests in the Korean reunification 
process.  Continuing with its measured and adaptive, low profile approach to Korean 
reunification would unnecessarily risk Japan’s considerable stake on the Korean 
peninsula as well as in the East Asia region.                       











V. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
 The U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula during the Cold War, at least 
on the surface, were largely unquestioned.156  It was to bolster South Korean democracy 
and contain communism.  With the demise of the Soviet Union and the decline of 
communism in many parts of the world, however, the common threat for the South 
Koreans and the U.S. had all but disappeared.  For North Korea, the end of the Cold War 
brought with it harsh political realities.  With China embarking on its own reforms, North 
Korea became mostly isolated and was for the most part, abandoned by the international 
community.  As a result, it became desperate for its own survival.  Accordingly, a 
dynamic and complex relationship between the three countries has emerged.  Yet, U.S. 
foreign policy has failed to recognize this new dynamic and adjust its policies 
accordingly. 
The demise of the Soviet empire, signified by the fall of the Berlin Wall, occurred 
almost fifteen years ago and changed the entire landscape of the geopolitical and security 
environment in Northeast Asia.  Yet, U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula 
remains largely unchanged from the Cold War period although the U.S. national interests 
have changed dramatically.  Due in large part to the anachronistic foreign policy toward 
the two Koreas, the U.S. has alienated the South Korean people and is at risk of losing its 
strategic foothold on the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asia region.   
With the continuing non-resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons 
problem, coupled with the emergence of China as a regional power, a clear articulation of 
U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula is needed more than ever.  The main 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. national interests in the context of current U.S. 
foreign policy toward the two Koreas, and offer a critique and propose recommendations 
on how to redefine U.S. national interests in the post-Cold War geopolitical and geo-
economic environments.   
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Toward that end, this chapter will first explore in detail the concept of national 
interest in generic terms separate from Korea policy.  It will then follow up with some 
background on the U.S.-Korea relationship.  An analysis of China’s role and influence 
will be presented along with its implications for U.S-South Korea relations.  Given this 
context, this chapter will explore what the national interests should be, in light of the 
ever-changing geopolitical landscape in the East Asia region.   
 
A. THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
 The U.S. decision to invade Iraq has brought to the forefront many questions 
regarding the nature of U.S. national interests.  Critics contend it was a war-of-choice 
rather than a war-of-necessity.157  Others argue that it was in the national interest as well 
as international interest, to bring an end to the Saddam Hussein regime and installing a 
democratic government.158  This debate regarding the legitimacy of the Iraqi war is a 
good example of the emotional and wide-ranging discussions about how to define the 
national interest.  Much of the confusion stems from the geopolitical complexities of the 
post-Cold War world, not to mention the post-9/11 world.  Writing about the national 
interest, Samuel Huntington asks, “Without the Cold War, what’s the point of being an 
American?  If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, 
democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there 
threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what 
becomes of American national interests?”159   
During the Cold War, the overriding U.S. national interest was to contain and 
defeat communism.  All other goals and interests that clashed with this purpose were 
subordinated to it.  For forty years, virtually all the great American initiatives in foreign 
policy, as well as many domestic policies, were justified by this overriding priority:  the 
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Marshall Plan, NATO, the Korean War, nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, 
intelligence operations, the space program, military alliances with Japan and Korea, 
support for Israel, overseas military deployments, the Vietnam War, the openings to 
China, support for Afghan Mujahideen and other anti-communist insurgencies.160  
Without the Soviet threat, there is no justification for most of these major initiatives.  
During the Cold War, the existence of a common threat galvanized the Americans and 
promoted identity and cohesion.  It can be argued that the much of the economic, 
technological, and social progress in the U.S. was the result of World War II and the Cold 
War.161       
 
1. Definition of National Interest  
 With the end of the Cold War and with growing interdependence among nations 
and no real peer-competitor to the U.S., there have been wide-ranging and divergent 
views on how to define and prioritize national interests.  Generally speaking, there are 
two basic schools of thought about how national interests should be defined.  The realist 
school of thought which includes statesmen such as Otto van Bismarck in the nineteenth 
century and Richard Nixon in the twentieth, holds that national interests should be 
defined in terms of a state’s tangible power and sphere of influence relative to those of 
other states.162  The single most important form of tangible power is the military and a 
nation’s ultimate challenge is to maintain a balance of military power that is favorable to 
its country.  The other school holds that national interests should be defined more broadly 
to encompass values such as human rights, economic freedom, and political freedom.  In 
the contemporary age, most of the prevailing thought on national interest is geared more 
toward the latter thought.  Having said that, however, most people’s definition is 
sufficiently vague that it is tough to categorize it in one camp or the other, and many 
encompass both views.    
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Joseph Nye broadly defines national interest as a set of interests that are widely 
shared by Americans in their relations with the rest of the world.163  Samuel Huntington 
views the national interest as a public good of concern to all or most Americans; a vital 
national interest is one which they are willing to expend blood and treasure to defend.164  
Some even point to Alexander Hamilton’s vision of national interest at the beginnings of 
the Republic, who said that his aim was not to “recommend a policy absolutely selfish or 
interested in nations; but to show, that a policy regulated by…interests, as far as justice 
and good faith permit, is, and ought to be, the prevailing one.”165   
Thus, at a minimum, U.S. national interests should articulate whether its interests 
include values as well as strategic interests, and whether international interests should be 
a major influence on national interests.   
 
2. Strategic Interests Versus Values-Based Interests 
 Nye argues that national interest is broader than private interest and also broader 
than protection against geopolitical threats.  In this regard, Nye makes a distinction 
between strategic interest and national interest, commenting that, “strategic interest is 
part of, but not necessarily identical to, the national interest.  In a democracy the national 
interest is what a majority, after discussion and debate, decides are its legitimate long-run 
shared interests in relation to the outside world.”166  These interests can include moral 
values, human rights, or a sense of national pride.  Foreign policy initiatives based on 
moral values-based interests can often times go against how others perceive the strategic 
interests of the United States.  National interests, thus, is broader and encompasses many 
more aspects than strategic interests alone.    
The U.S. support of Israel is a good example of morals and values-based interests 
taking priority over strategic interests.  Most would agree that U.S. support for Israel is 
not in the strategic interest because the United States’ primary interest in the Middle East 
                                                 
163 See Nye, Joseph S., “Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest,” The Atlantic Monthly, July 
1991, Vol. 268, pp 56-64 
164 Huntington, 1997, p. 32 
165 Quoted in James Chace, “The National Interest,” World Policy Journal, Winter 1993, p. 109 
166 Nye, 1991, p. 57 
69
is oil.  One could even argue, from a purely strategic viewpoint, that the Middle East 
would be much more stable if Israel were to perish.  By continuing to support Israel, the 
U.S. is going directly against its strategic interests.  The support for Israel, however, 
extends far beyond its strategic interests and involves core fundamental values.  The 
support is based partly on shared Judeo-Christian beliefs.  It is also based on a sense of 
historical guilt related to the Holocaust.167  Americans, by and large, have great 
admiration for the Israeli democracy and its underdog role in the Middle East.  Moreover, 
strategists who believe alliances are crucial, consider the United States’ continued 
commitment to Israel as an integral part of U.S. efforts at a new world order.  Thus, 
morals and values-based purposes play an integral part in defining U.S. national interests, 
and sometimes even outweighing the strategic interest, as exemplified in U.S. foreign 
policy toward Israel.          
Huntington agrees with Nye in this regard, pointing out that national interest 
usually combine security and material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical 
concerns, on the other.  Huntington writes, “Military action against Saddam Hussein [1st 
Gulf War] was seen as a vital national interest because he threatened reliable and 
inexpensive access to Persian Gulf oil and because he was a rapacious dictator who had 
blatantly invaded and annexed another country.  During the Cold War the Soviet Union 
and communism were perceived as threats to both American security and American 
values; a happy coincidence existed between the demands of power politics and the 
demands of morality.”168 
Condoleezza Rice also agrees, arguing that “there are those who would draw a 
sharp line between power politics and a principled foreign policy based on values.  This 
polarized view -- you are either a realist or devoted to norms and values -- may be just 
fine in academic debate, but it is a disaster for American foreign policy.  American values 
are universal.  People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those 
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who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the 
international balance of power favors those who believe in them.”169   
There are those, however, who argue that moral preferences have no place in 
defining national interest.  Foreign policy experts, who are aligned with the realism 
school of thought argue that such values cannot and should not be part of the national 
interest. 170  They prefer to identify the national interest with the strategic interest and 
warn against the pitfalls of confusing moral preferences with strategic interest.  Max Boot 
of the Wall Street Journal points out that, “Realpolitikers scoff at intrusions by morality 
into foreign policy. They believe that nations are governed by immutable geostrategic 
imperatives and that ideology counts for little in international relations. Realpolitikers 
preach stability; Wilsonians prefer revolution.171   
Nevertheless, it is clear that values-based interests have always had and always 
will play an integral part in defining American national interests.  In analyzing and 
understanding foreign policy, however, it is critical to recognize the dividing lines 
between strategic and values-based interests and the role it plays in the overall 
formulation of national interests.  
 
3. National Interests Versus International Interests 
 Some have argued that it is becoming very difficult to distinguish between 
national interests and international interests because Americans share an interest in world 
order.172  Because of increased security and economic interdependence, coupled with 
advancements in information technologies that allow for instant information access, even 
slight instabilities halfway around the globe can cause severe economic and security 
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concerns.  Nye argues that it is becoming ever more difficult for the Americans to isolate 
what happens inside the U.S. and what happens outside.173   Many internationalists 
would agree that, in essence, world interests are American national interests.   
Of course, many have differing views.  Condoleeza Rice argues that foreign 
policy should, “…proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the 
interests of an illusory international community.174   
The bottom line is that national interests will always take precedence but the line 
between the two is becoming increasingly blurred.  A combination of technological, 
commercial, and political trends is shortening distances, opening borders, and connecting 
far-flung cultures and economies.  The growth of the global marketplace, along with the 
deepening and widening of interdependence among regions and countries makes 
international interests America’s own interests.               
 
4. Questions of Merit  
 Despite its seeming importance, there are various criticisms on the mere concept 
of national interest.  Many have charged it with being ambiguous, undemocratic, 
irrational, obsolescent, and exclusivist.175   They argue that the notion of national interest 
is ineffectual in formulating foreign policy.  J. David Singer comments that the “concept 
is nearly useless for guiding us in the choice of policies in the future or as a yardstick for 
evaluating those that were followed in the past.  There are no consistent criteria beyond 
the vague and the abstract….the criteria of interest lead to interventionism on one 
occasion and distancing on another, to urgency here and patience there, to a concern 
individual rights in one case and to “national honor” in another, to hanging tough against 
one rival and to showing flexibility in another, to economics over security here and vice-
versa there…the concept is vacuous and politically mischievous.”176   
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However, Condoleezza Rice, criticizing the Clinton Administration for a lack of a 
clear, prioritized list of national interests, argues that,  
In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated national 
interest either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the 
world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory 
pressures…American foreign policy should refocus the U.S. on the national 
interest and the pursuit of key priorities.177   
Further criticizing the Clinton Administration for its internationalist views, Rice 
comments,  
Many in the U.S. are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of 
power politics, great powers and power balances…this discomfort leads to a 
reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and norms, and the belief 
that the support of many states or even institutions like the United Nations, is 
essential to the legitimate exercise of power.  The ‘national interest’ is replaced 
with ‘humanitarian interest’ or the interests of the ‘international community.’  
The belief that the U.S. is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so 
on behalf of someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, 
and there are strong echoes of it in the Clinton administration.  To be sure there is 
nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a 
sense, a second-order effect.178   
 
To further complicate the issue, President Bush himself is labeled as Wilsonian.  
Writing about a statement in which President Bush called for the overthrow of Yassar 
Arafat, Max Boot of the Wall Street Journal observes, “…a more accurate description 
would be to say this represents the triumph of -- for want of a better term -- Wilsonians 
over realpolitikers, a development of considerable long term consequence.”179 
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5. The National Interest in the Post 9/11 Period  
 “The 9/11 attacks have changed everything,” is how many U.S. strategists have 
characterized the security environment.  Indeed, the National Security Strategy (NSS) 
released in September of 2002, dramatically shifted American military strategy from the 
traditional concepts of containment and deterrence toward unilateralism and pre-emptive 
action against hostile states and terrorist groups.  The NSS goes on to say that the U.S. 
will exploit its military and economic power to encourage “free and open societies,” 
rather than seek “unilateral advantage.”180  It calls this union of values and national 
interests “a distinctly American nationalism.” 
The NSS sketches out a far more aggressive approach to national security than at 
any time since the height of the Cold War.  The document also states that, while the U.S. 
will seek allies in the battle against terrorism, “We will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”181   
The first test of this new resolve, as outlined in the NSS, is currently being played 
out in Iraq.  And judging by the comments from the administration, the administration’s 
vision includes getting rid of the evil from what they call the “axis of evil,” and next in 
line seems to be North Korea.  The Far Eastern Economic Review reports, “After the 
United States security role in Iraq is reduced, hawks in the U.S. administration say 
Washington will look to tighten the noose around North Korea and its nuclear-weapons 
program.”182  Moreover, President Bush himself has commented, "I loathe Kim Jong-il.  
I've got a visceral reaction to this guy because he is starving his people.  It appalls me.  I 
feel passionate about this.  They tell me, well we may not need to move too fast, because 
the financial burdens on people will be so immense if this guy were to topple.  I just don't 
buy that."183   Judging by these statements, the only thing keeping the administration  
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from undertaking a regime change in North Korea are the current problems in Iraq.  This 
begs the question of whether a military attack and regime change in North Korea is in the 
U.S. national interest, even in this post-9/11 era.   
 
B. REDEFINING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA  
 It is against this backdrop that the U.S. must evaluate and define its national 
interests on the Korean peninsula.  The national interest should be used as a criterion to 
judge the effectiveness of a particular foreign policy.  This section will explore four main 
U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula.       
Since the mid-twentieth century, North Korea has presented the principal regional 
threat and is one of the key factors to maintaining regional peace and stability.  Deterring 
threats to U.S. security and maintaining regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia are 
enduring U.S. goals in the region.  Toward that end, maintaining a nuclear weapons-free 
Korean peninsula should be the top priority of U.S. policy toward North Korea.   
Another separate but not totally mutually exclusive objective is to prevent an 
outbreak of another Korean War.  Another war on the Korean peninsula will have 
profound implications for security and stability throughout Northeast Asia, a region that 
is home to 100,000 US troops and three of the world’s top 12 largest economies.184  
North Korea has a million-man army, possibly one or two nuclear weapons already, and a 
huge arsenal of conventional weapons.  Its artillery is especially fearsome:  More than 
10,000 guns, along with 2,500 rocket launchers capable of launching 500,000 shells an 
hour into Seoul.185  Indeed, another Korean war would cause reverberations around the 
world and forever change the political landscape of the East Asian region.  How would 
China react?  Which side would it be on?  How about Russia?  How about the role of 
Japan?  Each of these major powers will undoubtedly become politically, if not militarily, 
involved in the conflict in order to protect its interests on the Korean peninsula.  Aside 
from the security and political issues, it would also cause global economic chaos.        
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Another top priority is to sustain a strong U.S.-Korea relationship, or to be more 
specific, to maintain a strong U.S. influence on the peninsula as well as the region.  It is 
essential to achieving U.S. objectives.  The interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the 
United States will likely continue to intersect on the Korean peninsula, which has become 
the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia.  Accordingly, the major powers will seek to 
control the Korean peninsula for strategic influence and dominance.  China, as the nearest 
peer-competitor to the U.S. poses the biggest threat (or opportunity for partnership, 
depending on one’s worldview) for the United States.  Either way, it is critical for the 
U.S. to maintain strong regional influence to neutralize China’s growing power.  
Essential to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in the short and long terms, is a prudent 
U.S. policy that will support South Koreans and seek to retain a strong U.S.-Korea 
political, economic, and security relationship. 
In the realm of values-based interests, a top interest should be to reunify the two 
Koreas for humanitarian reasons as well as to live up to its moral obligation to reunify the 
two Koreas.  As part of the U.S.-Soviet Union agreement, Korea was administratively 
divided for what was supposed to be only long enough to reconvey sovereignty and self-
determination to the Korean nation.186  This endgame was supposed to be achieved “in 
due course” as promised by the U.S., China, and Great Britain via the wartime Cairo 
declaration in 1943.187  It has been almost sixty years since the division and fifteen years 
since the Soviet Union collapsed and Korea still remains senselessly divided.  This is in 
large part due to U.S. policies toward the two Koreas in which it has mostly undermined 
reunification efforts.  Many South Koreans still have living family members in the North 
and the U.S. has the moral obligation to reunite the two Koreas before this generation 
passes on.  Moreover, there are reports of widespread famine with victims numbering in 
the millions.  There are also reports of “political penal labor colonies” which hold as 
many as 200,000 prisoners barely surviving day to day.188  Some have even compared 
the North Korean labor camps to Hitler’s concentration camps and have urged the 
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international community to take action to stop the abuse before it gets to Holocaust-level 
conditions.189  Indeed, if the U.S. is serious about fulfilling its values-based interests as 
well as its strategic interests, as its past foreign policy initiatives has shown, then the 
reunification of the two Koreas as the solution to solve the multitude of values-based 
issues should be right in line with the current Bush doctrine.      
Lastly, the collapse, or rather the end of the Kim regime, should be one of the top 
priorities.  However, this is much easier said than done as the Kim regime has continued 
to survive for close to sixty years despite predictions to the contrary.              
 
C. SUMMARY 
 Despite the Bush administration’s rhetoric on maintaining a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula, it is apparent that its main focus is to end Kim Jong-Il’s reign and promote a 
regime change in North Korea.  By doing so, however, the U.S. has lost focus on the 
more-important issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.  As the Perry report 
recommended, the overriding objective of U.S. policy should be to end Pyongyang’s 
nuclear weapons and missile programs.  The magnitude of the consequences is so great 
that the U.S. should do everything it can to ensure Pyongyang gives up its nuclear 
ambitions.  Accordingly, the top U.S. national interest should be to maintain a nuclear-
free Korean peninsula.190       
Secondly, the U.S. should do all it can to avoid another war on the Korean 
peninsula.  Unlike Iraq, where there were relatively low casualties, the casualty estimates 
for another Korean war are as high as twelve million people including over 100,000 U.S. 
troops.  This scenario all but eliminates the military option and should be used as a last 
resort to keep North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.    
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Next on the list is to maintain the U.S.’s influence on the Korean peninsula.  
Maintaining a strong strategic influence on the Korean peninsula can mean the difference 
in a possible clash with China for dominance in East Asia.  With the anti-American 
sentiment reaching disturbing levels in South Korea, it is critical, more than ever, to 
maintain its strong alliance with Seoul.  In this regard, the U.S. needs to be more flexible 
in its North Korean policies and let South Korea have a bigger say in its desire for 
reunification.                
Fourth, the matter of reunifying the two Koreas for humanitarian purposes -- to 
bring an end to widespread suffering of the North Korean people at the hands of the 
brutal Kim regime, and to reunite the Korean people after sixty years of separation -- 
should be one of the top priorities.  Although it is not a strategic interest, these types of 
morals-based interests have been an integral part of American foreign policy calculations 
since the inception of the U.S. republic.    
Fifth on the list is bringing about an end to the Kim regime.  A distinction should 
be made here in the two ways of ending the Kim regime.  One is the implosion or 
collapse of the regime scenario, which many experts have predicted ever since the death 
of Kim Il-sung in 1994.  The other is a peaceful change in regime.  Judging by its actions 
and remarks, the Bush administration’s strategy seems to be that of bringing about a 
regime change in either of these two ways.  A collapse of the Kim regime, however, will 
bring about great chaos and uncertainty, and could prove to be very harmful to the 
stability of the region.  To that end, a peaceful regime change is in the best interest of the 
United States and the international community.  It seems highly unlikely, however, that 
either one will occur without great external pressure, either politically or militarily.  In 
all, this is the lowest priority since a regime change does not guarantee stability on the 
Korean peninsula.       
In sum, the number one national interest of the U.S. -- to keep North Korea from 
acquiring nuclear weapons -- should be achieved at all costs.  The actions of the Bush 
administration, however, seem to indicate that the U.S. can tolerate a North Korea with 
nuclear weapons at its disposal.  The Bush administration seems to have lost sight of this 
all-important national interest and seem too narrowly focused on not giving any 
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concessions to Pyonyang.  The clear message from the Bush administration is that it 
wants a regime change, even at the risk of providing Pyongyang valuable time to produce 
multiple nuclear weapons.  By remaining inflexible in its strategy to not negotiate 
bilaterally with North Korea, it has locked the negotiations into a stalemate with no signs 
of progress.   
A clear articulation of the U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula can 
serve to set priorities and bring this issue back into focus.  Accordingly, the U.S. policy 
toward the two Koreas should be formulated to achieve this overriding national interest.      
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VI. KOREAN REUNIFICATION STRATEGY 
 In this chapter the Korean reunification policy strategy will be introduced.  In 
order to compare and contrast the broad policy options and to gain full appreciation for 
the recommended option, the policies of the Bush administration and the Clinton 
administration will be examined.   
 
A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S NORTH KOREA POLICY 
 Judging by their actions and President Bush’s comments, the Bush 
administration’s view of the U.S. national interests on the Korean peninsula can be best 
described as that of promoting a regime change.  Simply put, they want to get rid of Kim 
Jong-Il.  The Bush administration’s original strategy was to lead the allies in a campaign 
to squeeze North Korea into submission.  When South Korea and other allies balked and 
North Korea responded with a policy of brinkmanship, U.S. had little choice but to 
change strategies.  Subsequently, the post-9/11 Bush administration seems to be caught 
between trying to do what they want to do (a preemptive military action to end Kim’s 
reign) versus what they should do (negotiate an agreement to stop North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program).  The Bush administration greatly desires to remain consistent in their 
hard-line policies against rogue states, but they also understand that their doctrine of 
preemption, if applied to North Korea, can have dire consequences. 
This may explain why the Bush administration’s actions seem very indecisive and 
disjointed.  On one hand, they are refusing to negotiate with them for the fear of being 
viewed as appeasing to North Korea.  On the other hand, they are refusing to take any 
preemptive military action, as they did in Iraq, whom many experts consider to be the 
lesser of the axis-of-the-evils.  Instead, they seem to be wedged in the middle between 
diplomacy and military action, stalling for time until they can resolve the Iraqi conflict 
and focus their efforts on North Korea.  In the process, however, they are providing 
valuable time to the North Koreans to develop its nuclear weapons as well as the missiles 
to deliver them.   
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As the talks have stalled, North Korea is well on its way, if it already has not, to 
developing a nuclear bomb, as well as the missile technology for its delivery.  The CIA 
estimates that North Korea already has two nuclear weapons and is well on its way to 
making many more, perhaps as many as one a month.191  Time is critical because the 
difference between having two bombs and ten or more is crucial.  It can mean that North 
Korea can conduct tests, sell nuclear weapons on the black market, conduct offensive 
strikes, and use them for defensive purposes, as well.192  A nuclear armed North Korea 
will have severe repercussions throughout the Northeast Asia region and the world.  
Foremost, it will change the balance of power in Asia, which could prompt Japan to 
intensely re-arm itself, possibly setting off an arms race and military instability in the 
region.  The history of conflict between Japan, Korea, and China, would surely resurface, 
this time with far greater political and economic consequences to the international 
community.   
The neoconservatives, the main pillar of foreign policy thinking in the Bush 
administration, view the Pyongyang regime as a major threat to U.S. post-Cold War 
security.  Their position on “rogue states” has been consistent and inflexible -- “no 
persuasion and no compromise.”193  According to this camp, the U.S. and rogue states 
are pitted against each other in irreconcilable conflict.  Because U.S. values and its 
economic system threaten to undermine the foundations of such regimes, rogue states 
will attempt to upset the international order the U.S. has worked to build under its 
hegemony.194  Anything resembling a compromise would be considered appeasement. 
If one analyzes the alternative options and their possible consequences, however, 
it is clear that the Bush administration has no choice but to try to negotiate.  By being so 
intent on trying not to be viewed as appeasers, they seemed to have lost focus of the big 
picture.  As a result of the stalemate, the North Koreans have gained valuable time to 
produce more nuclear weapons, to use for bargaining.  Overwhelmed by the Iraqi 
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situation, the Bush administration chose to try to stall and bide as much as time as 
possible.  Time, however, is not on United States’ side and North Korea has used it very 
effectively to their advantage. 
 To understand the Bush administration’s rationale for its North Korean policy 
and its severe aversion to anything resembling “appeasement,” one has to analyze the 
Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea. 
 
B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S NORTH KOREA POLICY 
 During the 1994 nuclear standoff, the Clinton administration was prepared to 
bomb the Yongbyon facility rather than see it start up.  They realized, however, that 
military action could trigger a war costing tens or hundreds of thousands, or even a 
million Korean and American lives.  Instead, they chose to negotiate with Pyongyang.   
As a result, the Clinton administration’s policy on North Korea is inextricably tied to the 
controversial 1994 Agreed Framework that came out of those negotiations.  Republican 
members of Congress viewed this agreement as “appeasement” and believed it to be bad 
deal for the United States.  Some senators went as far as calling the Clinton 
administration treasonous and called the president a traitor.195     
Granted, one may concede that it was appeasement, but upon closer analysis, 
however, it can be shown that the positive outcomes of the agreement far outweighed the 
negative aspects.  The best justification of the agreement was that the agreement worked.  
First and foremost, it averted a potentially catastrophic situation, that of a possible war on 
the Korean peninsula.  Secondly, it froze North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, not 
only the activities at Yongbyon, but potential activities at other reactors as well, in 
various stages of construction.196  Lastly, there was no other viable alternative except to 
overthrow the Kim regime.   
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Critics also argue that the agreement did not work because North Korea never 
lived up to their end of the deal.  From all indications, however, the U.S. was as much to 
blame for failure of the agreement as the North Koreans were.  Indeed, the Secretary of 
Defense at the time, William Perry, freely admits that the U.S. did not live up to its side 
of the agreement due to fierce opposition from the Republican-controlled Congress.197  In 
sum, the Agreed Framework did provide very positive outcomes and failed only because 
of the political realities of the time.  More importantly, it showed that the U.S., with the 
right combination of “carrots” and “sticks,” can negotiate with the Kim regime and have 
them live up to the agreement.   
Following the Agreed Framework, engagement toward North Korea gradually 
replaced the Cold War strategy of containment as the main policy, both in Washington 
and in Seoul.  Kim Dae-Jung’s election as president of South Korea and his “Sunshine 
Policy” further boosted engagement activities.  The advocates of the Sunshine policy 
viewed North Korea’s erratic and hostile behavior as stemming from its sense of 
insecurity and vulnerability, and that diplomacy is the best way to deal with the regime.   
The Sunshine policy drew support from the Clinton administration, which 
realized that it had no other viable option.  Indeed, in October 1999, a team of policy 
analysts led by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry reviewed U.S. policy 
toward North Korea and recommended engaging Pyongyang.  The Perry report called for 
continued progress toward comprehensive normalization of relations with the DPRK 
once it abandoned its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.   It further 
states, “The urgent focus of U.S. policy toward the DPRK must be to end its nuclear 
weapons and long-range missile-related activities.”198   
With tacit approval from the Clinton administration, a series of personal 
exchanges and economic collaboration between the two Koreas led to the historic June 
2000 summit meeting between the Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il.  More importantly, 
though, Washington and Pyongyang also exchanged top-level emissaries.  It culminated 
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with Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit to North Korea, becoming the highest 
ranking U.S. official to visit North Korea.  In what has now become an almost surreal 
scene, pictures of Secretary Albright toasting with Kim Jong-Il were broadcast all over 
the world.  Following this visit, there was serious consideration for President Clinton to 
make a formal historic visit to North Korea to possibly pave the way to normalize 
relations with North Korea.199   
Despite these advances, however, suspicions of Pyongyang’s true intentions 
remained.  Conservative hardliners in Washington as well as Seoul believed North 
Korea’s aggressive behavior stemmed from its ultimate goal of uniting the two Koreas 
under the communist flag and subjugating the South under the North, using weapons of 
mass destruction to achieve its goals.  Indeed, Pyongyang’s past record of terrorism, 
sponsorship of other terrorist states, and violation of human rights, makes the engagement 
policy very hard to defend.  As such, when the Bush administration, with its 
neoconservative views, took over, the U.S. policy changed dramatically.         
 
C. MOTIVATION BEHIND NORTH KOREA’S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
 The structural realism school of thought is based on the core belief that anarchy is 
the defining characteristic of the international system and that it compels states to make 
security their overriding concern.  Anarchy forces security-seeking states to compete with 
each other for power, because power is the best means to survival.  Under this notion, 
North Korea’s vigorous pursuit of nuclear weapons should not have been surprising and 
should have been expected.  Considering the circumstances, from North Korea’s 
perspective, it has no choice but to try to acquire nuclear capabilities.  The U.S., 
undeniably the most powerful nation in the world, has declared your country to be part of 
an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and Iraq, which it just annihilated in a war and brought 
about a regime change.  Moreover, the U.S. has 38,000 troops stationed in South Korea, 
with whom North Korea is still technically at war.  The distribution of capabilities in 
conventional weapons is resoundingly in favor of the United States.  North Korea’s only  
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ally, China, seems to be distancing itself from Pyongyang and North Korea has become 
even more isolated from the world community.  To top it all off, North Korea is on the 
verge of total economic collapse.  
In this kind of international environment, all states, regardless of lower unit-level 
factors, would behave in the same way, which is to make security their paramount 
concern, in order to ensure their survival.  Under this premise, Kim Jong-Il is not a crazed 
lunatic after all.  Rather, he is behaving logically, in accordance with realism, the widely 
accepted form of international relations theory.  Robert Jervis, a political scientist, 
describes this scenario as “compulsion in extreme circumstance,” as he argues, “the 
greater the external compulsion, the greater the homogeneity of behavior and therefore 
the less the need to study decision-making…Imagine a number of individuals, varying 
widely in their predispositions, who find themselves inside a house on fire.  It would be 
perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel 
compelled to run toward the exits…Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush for 
the exits, there is no need to analyze the individual decision that produced it.”200  For 
North Korea, Kim Jong-Il perceived the fire, as any other leader would, as soon as they 
were labeled an axis-of-evil state by the United States.  Since North Korea cannot ensure 
their security with only conventional weapons, it follows reason that they would try to 
develop nuclear weapons.  If self-help is the necessary principle of action in an anarchic 
order, then North Korea is acting in accordance with prime tenets of realism theory.  In 
other words, the structural characteristic of the international system is forcing them to 
behave in this manner.  If they do not, they will be punished, i.e., they will cease to exist 
as a state.    
Additionally, in analyzing North Korea’s history of behavior before the “axis-of-
evil” statement, one can see that North Korea never intended to give up their nuclear 
weapons program, as evidenced by their initiative to build the Yongbyon nuclear 
complex in 1989, just 4 years after they signed the NPT.  The events that led up to the 
1994 Agreed Framework (threats to reprocess fuel from the reactors which give them 
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enough plutonium to process six nuclear weapons, and to turn Seoul into a “sea of 
flames”) is especially troubling because the threats by the North Koreans in 1994 seem so 
eerily similar to threats they are making in the current crisis.  In the ensuing ten years, 
there were major domestic changes for both countries.  North Korea’s “great leader,” 
Kim Il-Sung died in 1994 and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-Il, and the U.S. went 
from Bush I to Clinton to Bush II.  Through these changes, North Korea remained 
steadfast in their determination to develop nuclear weapons.      
North Korea’s dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons highlights a couple of very 
important lessons in the realism theory.  It highlights the relatively constant behavior of 
North Korea regarding nuclear weapons in light of major domestic changes (succession 
from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-Il) and external changes (major policy change from 
Clinton to Bush).  Since one can argue that North Korea always had the intention of 
acquiring nuclear weapons, their behavior never really changed over time, even though 
the Clinton and Bush administrations had far different policies toward them.  The unit-
level, domestic determinants of the U.S. never mattered to them, only the structural 
constraints of the international system.  From North Korea’s viewpoint, acquiring nuclear 
weapons would fundamentally change the distribution of capabilities across the system.  
It would have a dramatic system-level effect.201  Realists would argue that North Korea 
never had the intention of adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) they 
signed in 1985, or rather, that they would be forced to violate the treaty due to structural 
constraints posed on them by the international system.   As a case in  point, North Korea 
threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 (it did withdraw in January 2003) and to 
restart its nuclear weapons program.  A nuclear crisis was averted with the negotiation of 
the Agreed Framework in 1994, which the critics labeled as appeasement and blackmail.   
Realists would argue that if the Clinton administration followed their prescription and 
understood the constraints of the system, the U.S. never would have agreed to the 1994  
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framework and would have taken a tougher stance to resolve the issue.  As a result, they 
would contend, the international community is being blackmailed with nuclear weapons 
again, just as it had been in 1994.   
Realism is very enduring because it focuses on the anarchic nature of the 
international system and the resulting security dilemma.  What it tells about the current 
crisis is that North Korea, given its present circumstances, will fight for its survival at all 
costs and views nuclear weapons as its savior.  What it also shows is that North Korea, no 
matter what kind of policies are in place, whether the U.S. tries to engage or contain 
North Korea, it will be resolute in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.  To Pyongyang, it is the 
only path to ensure its survival as a sovereign nation state.       
 
D. THE REUNIFICATION POLICY 
 The overriding objective for U.S. policy should be to immediately stop North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons development.  As it has been shown, however, both the Bush 
administration’s hard-line policy and Clinton administration’s co-opted Sunshine policy, 
albeit to a lesser extent, has failed to prevent North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.  So, if 
both engagement and containment has proven to be ineffective, what is the best course to 
take?  As discussed previously, most would agree that the most rational thing for North 
Korea to do is to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent against stronger nations.  
Accordingly, it is very unlikely that North Korea would give up its nuclear ambitions 
unless it felt that its security was not threatened.  In other words, as long as North Korea 
does not have any security guarantees from any of the superpowers and has to depend on 
itself for its security, the only rational thing for them to do is provide their own security 
measures.  The fact that it is developing WMD should not have been a surprise to any 
political experts.  Taking these factors into consideration, a U.S. policy to reunify the two 
Koreas is the best policy option available.   
A reunified Korea would immediately resolve the nuclear issue and also eliminate 
the possibility of another Korean war.  Assuming the implementation was well planned 
and executed, with the U.S. leading the way in a multilateral negotiation, it would also 
serve to maintain or even increase U.S. influence in the region.  Maintaining influence is 
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essential to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in the short and long terms.  A prudent 
U.S. policy would support South Koreans and seek to retain a strong U.S.-Korea political, 
economic, and security relationship before, during, and after reunification.  Certainly, 
many Korea and regional experts have advocated for the reunification of the two Koreas 
as a formal U.S. policy.  As Selig Harrison writes, “In charting new policies in Korea 
attuned to post-Cold War realities, the starting point for the U.S. should be an expression 
of regret for the U.S. role in the division of he peninsula addressed to both the South and 
the North, accompanied by a declaration of support for peaceful reunification much more 
explicit and much more positive than the 1992 Bush Statement.”202   
Due to various reasons, however, U.S. foreign policy has undermined Korean 
efforts to create a unified Korea, and to encourage a new paradigm for Korea.203  Were 
Korea to unify, it could be financially expensive for the U.S., could lead to a loss of U.S. 
strategic access and leverage over Korea, could adversely affect Korea’s role in U.S.-
PRC relations, and could prove damaging to U.S.-Japan relations.204  With the nuclear 
crises looming, however, the U.S. can no longer afford to undermine unification efforts.  
It is in the best interests of the Korean people and U.S. foreign policy as well.  Measures 
will need to be implemented so that a unified Korea will eventually reflect South Korean 
democratic and market economy values.  There is no reason to believe why it should not, 
considering the relative conditions of the two countries.  In the short-term, however, 
accommodations may need to be made to placate Pyongyang, if for only face-saving 
purposes. Whether a unified Korea will pursue an independent security policy, transform 
the ROK-U.S. alliance, tilt toward China, or pursue some other arrangement will depend 
on the implementation strategy and the role of the U.S in those negotiations. 
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E. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY -- VISION 2010: A UNITED KOREA 
 The implementation should be carried out in a carefully planned step-by-step 
strategy in five distinct stages.  First, the U.S. needs to convince China that it would be in 
Beijing’s best interest for the two Koreas to unify, and for the two powers to preside over 
the unification.  Second, concessions would have to be made so that North Korea will 
stop its nuclear weapons program immediately and comprehensively.  Third, the major 
powers will need to normalize relations with North Korea and lift all economic sanctions.  
Fourth, the major stakeholders, U.S., China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, will have to 
provide aid and investments in order to develop North Korea’s economy.  An 
economically healthy North Korea would be much easier to absorb and would not be 
such a shock to the Korean economy as well as the regional economy.  Finally, at a date 
no later than the year 2010, the two Koreas would formally be reunified.  The year 2010 
holds great significance because it marks 100 years of either a division or foreign 
occupation of Korea -- 1910 was the last year that Korea was a unified, sovereign nation.    
 
1. Stage 0:  Setting the Stage with China 
 All considered, this is the most important stage because China holds the key to 
getting the North Koreans to cooperate and to have confidence in the process.  Without 
Beijing’s full endorsement and participation, it would be very difficult, if not almost 
impossible, to carry out good-faith negotiations with Pyongyang.  Since this is a make-or-
break deal, this stage should be carried out behind-the-scenes, in a covert manner, hence 
the term, Stage Zero.  It is stressed that the U.S. should not pursue this policy if it cannot 
obtain Beijing’s full endorsement.  That said, there is no reason why Beijing would 
oppose such a plan.  North Korea, in recent years, has become a big liability for Beijing, 
as China aspires to join the ranks of world’s superpowers.  Certainly, with its recent 
accession into the WTO and its continuing albeit limited pro-democracy reforms, China 
has transformed itself into a modern, free market-based economy, and the last thing 
China wants is to take on the liabilities of a failed state.  China is already complaining 
vigorously about the worsening refugee problems across its borders.  If China does resist, 
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however, the U.S. should not be averse to applying some coercive pressure.  China is 
North Korea’s sole patron and Beijing should start taking some of the blame and more 
responsibility for North Korea’s problems.   
Since the President officially formulates all foreign policy, the White House staff 
should coordinate with all stakeholders (State, CIA, Defense, Commerce, Treasury), and 
then appoint the State Department as the lead agency to implement this policy.  The State 
Department, as the lead agency, needs to engage Congressional leaders and various 
Senate and House committees as soon as it is feasible to pre-coordinate all efforts.  In 
fact, it is recommended that a cross-functional task force on Korean unification be 
formed that includes representatives from all the stakeholders identified above, including 
congressional committee members, to coordinate all efforts.205  That said, there needs to 
be one person who would oversee all efforts, and the most logical choice, as the Secretary 
of State, is Colin Powell.  Powell has the credibility among the international community, 
and unlike other members of the Bush administration, Powell does not seem to hold the 
same neoconservative beliefs about Korea, as evidenced by his statement shortly after his 
appointment that, “we do plan to engage with North Korea and pick up where President 
Clinton and his administration left off.  Some promising elements were left on the 
table.”206   
Granted, there will be strong opposition to this plan within the Bush 
administration as well as from many members of Congress.  More specifically, influential 
members within the administration as well as various think tanks and agencies, with 
strong neoconservative leanings such as Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, would 
pose opposition to this plan based on their zero-sum view of the world and international 
politics.  In the end, however, everyone would have to acknowledge that the North Korea 
has the upper hand in this standoff, and the alternative to a negotiated agreement -- a 
possible nuclear war -- is unacceptable.   
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Based on this analysis, any opposition to this plan would have to acknowledge the 
merits and the benefits of this plan.  Moreover, it would be an easy way out of this 
foreign policy mess.  Many consider the fact that North Korea now possesses nuclear 
weapons as a major foreign policy failure and attribute it mainly to neglect and 
miscalculation by the Bush administration foreign policy team.  For an administration 
that is in a severe foreign policy slump -- the Iraq situation is not getting any better and 
the ambitious Middle East peace process has all but been abandoned -- they would 
welcome an easy victory in the foreign policy arena.  Granted, it is not going to be easy, 
but compared to Iraq and the Middle East, it would be relatively simple given the fact 
that the U.S. would be following the lead of South Korea in this regard.207  Progress in 
the Korean peace process could divert attention away from other foreign policy 
shortcomings in what promises to be a very lively debate on the merits of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy matters.    
Once China and the U.S. agree to implement this plan, South Korea would be 
brought in (all still in a covert manner) and briefed on the plan and a round of 
negotiations with Seoul would begin.  Once this has been accomplished, Japan and 
Russia would be brought in and briefed on the plan and their input would be solicited.  
Once the main stakeholders buy into the unification strategy, China would engage North 
Korea and present the plan to Pyongyang and gauge its interest.  Of course, Beijing 
would be expected to use its considerable influence on Pyongyang to accept the offer, or 
at the very least, to come to the negotiation table and consider ending its nuclear 
ambitions.    
Once all the parties have agreed to the plan, the formal policy to unify the two 
Koreas by no later than 2010, would be formally announced to the world and multi-party 
negotiations would begin immediately. 
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2. Stage 1:  Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Program 
 The most urgent matter in this crisis, as the Perry report pointed out, is the nuclear 
weapons issue.  From North Korea’s perspective, what they desire the most is security 
guarantees and economic aid.  To that end, the US, China, Japan, and Russia will jointly 
provide security guarantees to North Korea as well as immediate economic aid.  In 
exchange, Pyongyang needs to agree to stop its nuclear weapons and missile 
development programs and subject themselves to immediate, intrusive, and 
comprehensive inspections by the IAEA.208   
So, why would this work now when it did not work before?  What would stop 
North Korea from stalling and reneging on the deal, as it did before?  The difference this 
time would be the overt pressure by Beijing.  Because of this fact, China becomes the 
most critical player in this process.  China is the only country that holds that much 
influence because, without Beijing’s support, the Kim regime knows that they cannot 
survive.   The main incentive for the North Koreans, however, is the prospect of 
reunification (Kim Il-sung envisioned reunifying as a Korean confederacy as early as the 
1960s209) and it would motivate Pyongyang to cooperate.    
 
3. Stage 2:  Normalize Relations and Lift Economic Sanctions 
 Once North Korea has been certified by the IAEA, the major powers would lift all 
economic sanctions on North Korea and normalize its relations.  Japan, in particular, 
would normalize its relations with North Korea and pay war reparations.  Again, this begs 
the question of why Japan would be willing to do this.  For Japan, having a sworn enemy 
and a rogue state like North Korea as its closest neighbor has to be very unsettling, 
especially since its military capabilities are limited by its constitution.  Although a strong 
unified Korea would pose some problems, a benevolent unified Korea would be far better 
than having North Korean nuclear mid-range Nodong missiles aimed at its country.  The 
North Korean threat has also been very destabilizing to its domestic politics as more 
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nationalistic sentiments are voiced and gain more widespread support.  A unified Korea 
would pose an economic threat but not necessarily a security threat, and certainly not to 
the extent that North Korea does now.      
For its part, the U.S. needs to formally put an end to the Korean War, normalize 
relations with Pyongyang, and replace the anachronistic 1953 armistice agreement with a 
new peace structure.210  The armistice agreement was set up in 1953 as a temporary and 
expedient measure to oversee the cease-fire but has lingered on for more than fifty years.  
As part of the normalization of relations, the U.S. would also sign a formal non-
aggression pact with North Korea at this stage.  These overtures by the U.S. would serve 
to soften North Korea’s paranoid attitude toward the U.S. and send a message that 
Washington is very sincere in its efforts to unify the two Koreas.  Political pressure by 
Beijing along with these inducements should be enough for North Korea to disarm.   
 
4. Stage 3:  Promote North Korean Economic Development 
 North Korea’s economic development will be critical to a smooth transition to a 
unified Korea.  It is recommended that North Korea follow China’s model of 
transitioning from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based economy by first 
establishing special economic zones and gradually reforming to a capitalist economy.  It 
has been reported that, during Secretary Albright’s visit to North Korea, Kim Jong-il 
expressed the view that he had been studying alternative economic systems for North 
Korea.211  Additionally, North Korea introduced some rudimentary elements of 
capitalism into its constitution, including limited private land ownership, state enterprise 
reforms, and a slight easing of internal travel restrictions.212   
With China’s help and active investments by the four powers plus the European 
Union, North Korea should be able to improve its economic viability.  If the economic  
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development of other East Asian countries is any indication, North Korea should be able 
to improve it economic health in a very dramatic manner.  This would pave the way for 
unification and lessen the economic burden.  
 
5. Stage 4:  Korean Unification 
 Once the hard work in the previous stages has been completed, the final stage 
would be to work out the details of the formal reunification.  What would a unified Korea 
look like?  The key is to find a solution that would be acceptable to all parties involved, 
particularly the two Koreas.  In his book on Korean unification, Kim Dae-jung offers up a 
three-stage approach.  Kim calls for the establishment of a Korean confederation.  This 
system of “one nation, two states, and two governments” would last for a ten-year period 
of peaceful coexistence and institutionalization of inter-Korean exchanges.  Key elements 
of the confederal structure would be mutual recognition, a peace treaty, and bi-national 
decision-making bodies.  This would be followed by a federal system of “one nation, one 
state, and two regions,” where foreign relations and national defense would be conducted 
by a central government with internal issues handled by the two regional governments.  
Unification would be completed under a central government with either integration of the 
two regions or federalization with provincial “states,” similar to a German or American 
system.213    
The ideas of a Korean confederal system are not new.  Kim Il-sung initially put 
forth his confederation system proposal in the 1960s, subsequently presented as the 
proposal for a “Confederal Republic of Koryo” on June 23, 1973, as part of a “Five-Point 
Program for Unification.”214  The proposition was further developed as the “Democratic  
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Confederal Republic of Koryo” proposal in October of 1980, and explained in detail in 
Kim Il-sung’s “Ten-Point Program for the Great Unity of the Korean People for 
Unification” in 1993.215 
Critics have argued that, given the vast differences between the two countries, a 
confederal system is impractical, especially given historical experiences with 
confederalism in America, Germany, Egypt, and Syria.216   An alternative to a confederal 
regime is a Korean Commonwealth, first proposed by Roh Tae-woo in 1989 and revised 
by his successor, Kim Young-sam in 1993.  The concept of commonwealth is neither a 
federal system nor a confederal arrangement, but a far looser system that follows the 
example of the European Community and the British Commonwealth.217 
As one can see, the nature of the political system will be a very contentious matter 
and the U.S. needs to be careful not to “Americanize” the unification by exerting too 
much influence.  The process needs to allow the two Koreas to come up with a system 
that is acceptable to both countries.  No matter which system is decided upon, it 
underscores the point that the two Koreas have been thinking seriously about 
reunification for a very long time.     
 
6. U.S. Policies Toward a Post-Unification Korea 
There are differing views on what the U.S. policy should be toward a united 
Korea.  On one side, there are those who are advocating for a phased disengagement from 
the Korean peninsula before and after the unification.  Selig Harrison concludes that the 
goal of the United States should be to disengage most of its forces from Korea gradually 
during a transition of roughly ten years while seeking to encourage a confederation 
diplomatically by shifting to a new role as an honest broker.218  Harrison contends that 
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region combined with a regional neutralization 
agreement in which China, Russia, the U.S., and Japan would all pledge to keep out of 
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the peninsula militarily, would promote stability in Northeast Asia.219   On the flip side, 
regional experts such as Robert Dujarric recommends a continued strong U.S. presence 
on the Korean peninsula after the unification, as he comments, “…the U.S. and its allies 
should plan for a large and prolonged U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan after 
Korean unification.”220   
Dujarric and other regional experts such as Derek Mitchell221 argue on the basic 
premise that the United States must have forward-based forces in Asia to protect its 
interests in Asia.  A united Korea with potentially a formidable economy and a 
population of 65 million would be an enticing ally for any of the major powers.  
Furthermore, a unified Korea not firmly in the orbit of Washington could be potentially 
threatening to Japan. Toward that end, Derek Mitchell recommends that the U.S. 
maintain a military presence on the post-unification peninsula as a symbol and guarantor 
of continued U.S. security commitments to the peninsula as well as the region.  Mitchell 
also recommends broadening the U.S.-Korean alliance to encompass regional security 
matters, which will require the U.S. to remain comprehensively engaged in the political, 
diplomatic, economic and military affairs of the entire region.222  For U.S. policymakers, 
the most important point in post-unification considerations is that the U.S. must be 
proactive in initiating serious discussions with its Northeast Asian allies about post-
unification security structures in East Asia, to ensure that prudent policy considerations 
will be in place once the unification occurs.   
 
F. U.S. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND VIEWS 
Any change in U.S. foreign policy, and especially in the dramatic fashion that is 
proposed here, would require enormous interagency effort in formulation and 
coordination of the proposed changes.  In order to characterize the general attitude of the 
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American body politic toward the North Korean nuclear issue, the following section 
surveys the differing views on how to deal with Pyongyang. 
 
1. Executive Branch Views 
 There seems to be a tug-o’-war between the hawks and the doves in the Bush 
administration.  It is, however, decidedly in the favor of the hardliners.  President Bush is 
deeply ideological and believes the U.S. should exploit its military and economic power 
to encourage "free and open societies," rather than seek unilateral advantage.  He calls 
this union of values and national interests "a distinctly American internationalism."223    
His vision includes getting rid of the evil from what he calls the axis of evil: Iraq, Iran, 
North Korea.  Regarding North Korea and Kim Jong-Il, President Bush has commented:  
I loathe Kim Jong II.  I've got a visceral reaction to this guy because he is 
starving his people.  It appalls me.  I feel passionate about this.  They tell me, 
well we may not need to move too fast, because the financial burdens on people 
will be so immense if this guy were to topple.  I just don't buy that.224  
Condoleezza Rice’s role seems to be that of a moderator between the camps but 
she also leans heavily toward the hawks.225 As one of the main contributors to the 
preemption doctrine, she is a leading advocate of an aggressive approach to national 
security.  Vice President Dick Cheney, the leader of the neo-conservative camp is the 
most hawkish of the President’s advisers.  Woodward’s book describes him as having the 
“fever” in going after Iraq.226  Cheney has the full trust of the President.  Bush will not 
make a decision without consulting with Cheney alone.227 
Secretary of State Colin Powell seems to be the lone prominent moderate in the 
administration and is often times the odd man out.  Still, he is loyal and will support the 
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administration’s cause despite his personal views.  Powell’s presentation to the United 
Nations on Iraq’s WMD connection is a good example.  He may, however, be more 
cautious in the future to advocate for the administration’s views again since he feels 
somewhat burned by the Iraqi presentation.  Certainly, though, he does have misgivings 
about the current hard-line strategy against North Korea.   When asked about his views 
on North Korea soon after his appointment, he commented, “we do plan to engage with 
North Korea and pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off.  Some 
promising elements were left on the table.”228  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seems more pragmatic than ideological.  
He does not really belong in the neo-conservation faction or any other ideological 
camps.229 If pressed, he would lean toward the hawk camp but the lessons from Iraq 
would definitely make him think twice about other military interventions under the 
administration’s preemption doctrine.   
 
2. Senate Leadership Views 
 Senator John McCain was the most vocal critic of the 1994 Agreed Framework 
brokered by the Clinton administration.  Sen. McCain viewed this agreement as 
“appeasement” and believed it to be bad deal.  He went as far as calling the Clinton 
administration treasonous and called the president a traitor.  On military action against 
North Korea, he is on record as saying, “While they may risk their populations, the U.S. 
will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people.  And spare us 
the usual lectures about American unilateralism.  We would prefer the company of North 
Korea’s neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must.”230  Recently, however, 
Sen. McCain has been advocating for a more proactive approach.  On the White House’s 
assertion that it is not a crisis, he comments, “the administration can start by calling it a  
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crisis, which it is.”231   Senator McCain supports the current hard-line stance against 
North Korea but not at the cost of providing North Korea time to develop nuclear 
weapons.   
Senator Ted Stevens (Chairman of Senate Appropriations Committee) along with 
other members (Senators Cochran, Inouye, Domenici, and Roberts) of the Appropriations 
committee visited North Korea in 1997 “to try to understand the views of the government 
in Pyongyang on the preliminary talks for the four-party process.”  He has also 
commented, “We stated the complete unanimity between the United States and the 
Republic of Korea on our shared objectives -- promote confidence-building measures, 
reduce tensions, and eliminate the possibility of a military conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula.”232  Of course, this was during the Clinton administration with a far different 
North Korea policy.   It is safe to conclude that Senator Stevens supports diplomacy but 
does not want to go against the position of the administration. 
Senator Byrd (ranking Democratic member of Appropriations Committee) is very 
critical of current policies and has commented in formal Senate remarks that,  
This (Bush) administration has steadfastly refused to engage in direct talks 
with North Korea or even to characterize the threat of North Korea's 
nuclear weapons program as a crisis.  Instead, the President and his 
advisers have continued to hurl invectives at Kim Jong Il while shrugging 
off increasingly alarming reports that North Korea is stepping up its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.  It is time – if it is not already too late – to 
drop the false bravado of indifference to the threat from North Korea and 
engage in face-to-face negotiations with the North Koreans.233   
Senator Warner (Chairman of Armed Services Committee) supports the Bush 
administration’s policies and has commented, “the situation in North Korea continues to 
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worsen, there's no question about it. This is very serious today, as it has been for months. 
And I think our president has very clearly said that no solution can be achieved simply by 
the United States and North Korea; it must be a multinational decision, that is China as a 
full partner, South Korea as a full partner, and, indeed, Japan as a partner on this 
issue.”234  On former Secretary of Defense Perry’s criticism of President Bush’s policy, 
Sen. Warner, rebuts, “I happen to know Secretary Perry very well, and I have a very high 
professional opinion of him, I worked with him closely here when he was in the 
Department of Defense…I must say I differ with the conclusion that he is reaching that 
we're on the brink of war or that there is no policy in this administration.”235   
Senator Levin (ranking Democrat on Armed Services Committee) has called on 
the Bush administration to talk directly to North Korea to ease tensions over its nuclear 
program.  “That does not imply capitulation. It does not imply concessions. It just simply 
means face to face we are going to discuss the differences ... in order to avoid 
miscalculation,”  Levin is on record as saying that North Korea poses a bigger threat to 
the United States than Iraq does. He credited Bush for not pursuing military action 
against North Korea, but said administration comments that it could fight the two 
countries simultaneously “plays right into North Korean paranoia.”236  
Senator Biden (ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee) has called 
on the Bush administration to negotiate with North Korea.  He commented, “Our 
challenge is clear: We must stop North Korea from going into production of fissile 
material and nuclear weapons.  If we do not, we will face many dangers. Including the 
likelihood North Korea could become a plutonium factory, selling fissile material to the 
highest bidder.”237 
In summary, it has been shown that, during the last couple of years this latest 
nuclear crisis has been ongoing, the hard-line approach does not work.  As such, there is 
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a growing sentiment among both the Republicans and the Democrats that the Bush 
administration’s hard-line stance on North Korea and its insistence on not having bilateral 
negotiations with North Korea is flawed.  Many members of Congress now feel that the 
hard-line policy of the Bush administration is only providing the North Koreans more 
justification to develop nuclear weapons.  Most importantly, however, they fear that it is 
providing Pyongyang the time to develop multiple nuclear weapons.  The time is ripe to 









The latest North Korean nuclear crisis has reignited concerns over how to deal 
with this problematic country.  This situation presents an enormous military and political 
crisis.  A North Korea with nuclear weapons presents vast and complex problems.  This 
issue goes to the heart of Northeast Asian security structure, to the future alliance 
arrangement of the U.S., China, Japan and South Korea, and to the broader issue of 
nuclear proliferation.  Because of the imminent threat that a nuclear weaponized North 
Korea would pose, the U.S. can no longer muddle through in its policy toward 
Pyongyang.  As the policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations have shown, North 
Korea’s nuclear threats cannot be effectively confronted through either containment or 
engagement.   
The hard-line containment policy, as carried out by the Bush administration, has 
only heightened tensions and has encouraged the North Koreans to be even more resolute 
in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration and its preemption doctrine 
have only raised the level of belligerence by Pyongyang.  Liberal engagement policies 
without any built-in punitive measures have also proven to be ineffective in eliminating 
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.  Given the severe consequences a nuclear weaponized 
North Korea would pose, the most prudent policy is to promote a reunification of the two 
Koreas, thereby resolving the nuclear issue once and for all and also eliminating the 
possibility of another Korean war that would devastate the region.  If done correctly, with 
the U.S. leading the way in a multilateral negotiation, the U.S. can maintain and even 
strengthen its influence.  Simply put, a unified Korea is in the best interests of all the 
stakeholders involved and most of all, the United States. 
 From all indications, the reunification of the two Koreas is only a matter of time 
before it happens.  The process seems to have built up enough momentum in the last 
couple of years that it really cannot be stopped.  One has to look no further than the 2004 
Olympics where, despite the on-going confrontation over nuclear weapons, North and 
South Korea once again marched together hand-in-hand during the opening ceremonies 
in Athens.  North Korea’s central television broadcasted the event and the announcers 
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commented that, “no one in the world could block our nation from marching forward 
under the flag of unification.”238  There is even talk of fielding one Korean team for the 
2008 Beijing Olympics.  The symbolism of this occurring in China is particularly 
important.  If the reunification is going to happen anyway, the U.S. needs to take every 
measure to ensure that its interests are met.  Otherwise, China is more than willing to lead 
the process and advance its own interests.  Indeed, China has taken on a much more 
involved role in the on-going six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue.  A U.S.-
led reunification of the two Koreas, vice a China-led effort, would immediately resolve 
the two most pressing problems for the United States vis-à-vis its relations with South 
Korea: the North Korean nuclear issue and maintaining its strategic role as the primary 
patron for Seoul.  The U.S. would also fulfill its obligation to reunify the two Koreas, 
after thoughtlessly dividing it more than fifty years ago in the chaotic aftermath of World 
War II. 
 Assuming the implementation was well planned and executed, with the U.S. 
leading the way in a multilateral negotiation, it would also serve to maintain or even 
increase U.S. influence on the Korean peninsula and in the region.  Always remaining 
mindful of growing Chinese influence on South Korea and the region, maintaining 
influence is essential to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in the short and long terms.  A 
prudent U.S. policy would support South Koreans and seek to retain a strong U.S.-Korea 
political, economic, and security relationship before, during, and after reunification.  The 
strained relations between the two countries if left unkempt can have lasting 
repercussions.  Mainly, it will have the effect of bringing South Korea back into the Sinic 
realm, which would dramatically alter the delicate balance of power that exists in 
Northeast Asia today.   
Moreover, it is the right thing to do.  This is the mess left behind from the Cold 
War and the United States should feel obligated to clean it up.  In what was supposed to 
be an expedient and temporary division to appease the two superpowers at the time has 
turned into a permanent separation of the Korean people for almost sixty years and more 
than fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  An 
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arbitrary and thoughtless line drawn along the 38th parallel has now become a permanent 
fixture and the only line that matters on the Korean peninsula.  It was a game played by 
the great powers in their struggle for dominance.  The game, however, ended a long time 
ago but they neglected to tell the Koreans.  Any objective observer of this situation would 
find it exasperating and astonishing that Korea remains a divided country after all these 
years.  The endgame -- that of a sovereign and independent Korea -- was promised by the 
major powers (the U.S., China, and Great Britain) in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 
U.S. has an obligation to fulfill it.  Korean reunification is a long overdue promise and 
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